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Tuberculosis (TB) is a significant health issue to both the general public and the 
officers who enforce our nation’s immigration laws. Current immigration enforcement 
policies increase the likelihood that immigration officers will encounter people with TB. 
Should the United States alter its immigration enforcement policies to address more 
directly the threat that tuberculosis poses to public health? This thesis reviews this 
question through the lens of the Advisory Council on Tuberculosis’s recommendation 
that the priority is to identify and treat all cases of active TB. This thesis provides a 
policy options analysis examining the status quo and three options suggested in the 
literature on TB: cure TB before removal, increase international cooperation in treating 
TB, and increase TB testing. This policy analysis identifies gaps in the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) ability to identify and treat active TB in the aliens 
encountered through the immigration enforcement process. Additionally, it recommends 
that the DHS require that all detained aliens be screened for active TB by use of a chest 
X-ray. It further recommends that the DHS completely cure all aliens found to have 
active TB, whether detained or released from detention, prior to their removal from the 
United States.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION .........................................................................5 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................................5 
1. Objective .........................................................................................6 
2. Boundaries of the Research...........................................................7 
3. Defining the Optimal Policy Solution ...........................................7 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................8 
1. The State of Tuberculosis in 2016.................................................8 
2. Tuberculosis in Custody ..............................................................11 
3. The Importance of Social Factors and Cross-Border 
Travel ............................................................................................12 
4. Strategies for Addressing TB in the Immigrant 
Population .....................................................................................14 
5. Case Studies in the TB Literature ..............................................19 
6. Gaps in the Literature on TB ......................................................20 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW ........................................................................21 
II. BACKGROUND ON TUBERCULOSIS ...........................................................23 
A. TUBERCULOSIS DISEASE AND INFECTION .................................23 
B. TESTING AND DIAGNOSIS .................................................................25 
1. Testing for the Presence of Mycobacteria Tuberculosis ..........26 
2. Laboratory Examination of Specimens .....................................27 
3. The Bacille Calmette-Guérin Vaccine ........................................28 
C. TREATMENT ..........................................................................................29 
D. TUBERCULOSIS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF 
INTEREST ...............................................................................................30 
1. Tuberculosis in the United States ...............................................30 
2. Tuberculosis in Mexico ................................................................32 
3. Tuberculosis in El Salvador ........................................................32 
4. Tuberculosis in Guatemala .........................................................33 
5. Tuberculosis in Honduras ...........................................................33 
6. Tuberculosis in China ..................................................................33 
7. Tuberculosis in India ...................................................................34 
8. Tuberculosis in Russia .................................................................35 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REMOVAL PROCESS .........................................37 
A. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ...........................37 
 viii 
B. INITIATING REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS ........................................38 
C. REMOVAL HEARINGS AND ORDERS OF REMOVAL.................39 
D. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS TIMEFRAMES ....................................40 
E. ASYLUM CLAIMS .................................................................................41 
F. EOIR STATISTICS .................................................................................42 
G. DETENTION DURING AND AFTER REMOVAL 
PROCEEDINGS ......................................................................................45 
H. UNEXECUTED ORDERS OF REMOVAL .........................................48 
IV. THE STATUS QUO: CURRENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
LAW AND POLICY AS THEY RELATE TO TUBERCULOSIS .................49 
A. CURRENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES ............49 
1. DHS Policy on Apprehension, Detention, and Removal ..........49 
2. Encounter and Arrest Policies and Practices ............................49 
3. Detention Policies and Practices .................................................51 
4. Removal Policies and Practices...................................................55 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERSECTION OF CURRENT 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND TB .................56 
1. The Intersection of Immigration Apprehension Policies 
and TB ...........................................................................................56 
2. The Intersection of Immigration Detention and TB .................58 
3. The Intersection of Removal Policies and TB ...........................60 
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................63 
V. POLICY OPTION: CURE TUBERCULOSIS BEFORE REMOVAL ..........65 
A. POLICY DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON TO THE 
STATUS QUO ..........................................................................................65 
1. Proposed Changes to the Status Quo Apprehension Policy .....65 
2. Proposed Changes to the Status Quo Detention Policies ..........67 
3. Proposed Changes to the Status Quo Removal Policy ..............72 
B. ANALYSIS OF CURING TB BEFORE REMOVAL ..........................72 
1. The Cost of Detention ..................................................................73 
2. Issues with Alternatives to Detention .........................................73 
3. Limitations on ICE Funded Medical Care ................................74 
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................75 
VI. POLICY OPTION: INCREASE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
TO TREAT TUBERCULOSIS AFTER REMOVAL ......................................77 
A. POLICY DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON TO STATUS 
QUO ..........................................................................................................78 
1. Current International Cooperation Measures ..........................78 
 ix 
2. Current Public Health Cooperation Efforts between the 
United States and Other Countries ............................................79 
3. U.S.-Funded Directly Observed Therapy (Short-Course) 
Programs .......................................................................................80 
4. Technology Enabled Directly Observed Therapy (Short-
Course) ..........................................................................................81 
5. Contact Investigations .................................................................83 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE INCREASED INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION POLICY OPTION ....................................................84 
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................85 
VII. POLICY OPTION: INCREASE TUBERCULOSIS TESTING .....................87 
A. THE STATUS QUO OF TB TESTING .................................................88 
B. ANALYSIS OF TB TESTING METHODS IN AN 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SETTING ..................................90 
1. Tuberculin Skin Test ...................................................................90 
2. Interferon Gamma Release Assay Blood Test ...........................91 
3. Chest X-Ray ..................................................................................92 
4. Acid Fast Bacilli Test ...................................................................93 
C. ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL TB TESTING .....................................94 
1. Testing for Latent TB Infection versus Testing for TB 
Disease ...........................................................................................94 
2. Choice of Testing Methodology ..................................................95 
3. Testing at Apprehension versus Additional Testing in 
Detention .......................................................................................96 
4. Targeted Testing versus General Testing ..................................97 
D. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................97 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................99 
A. PROS AND CONS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS................................99 
1. Pros and Cons of the Status Quo Policy.....................................99 
2. Pros and Cons of Curing TB before Removal .........................100 
3. Pros and Cons of Increased International Cooperation to 
Treat TB after Removal ............................................................101 
4. Pros and Cons of Additional Testing .......................................102 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION: A HOLISTIC APPROACH .......103 
C. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES ............................................................105 
D. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................107 
LIST OF REFERENCE ................................................................................................109 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .................................................................................117 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1. Immigration Court Cases Received by Case Type ....................................43 
Table 2. Immigration Court Initial Case Completions by Case Type ......................44 
Table 3. Immigration Court Initial Case Completions for Detained Aliens 
(Including IHP) ..........................................................................................45 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACET  Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis 
AFB  acid fast bacilli 
ATD  alternatives to detention 
BCG  bacille Calmette-Guérin vaccine 
BIA  Board of Immigration Appeals 
CBP  U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CDF  contract detention facility 
CIS  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DIHS  Division of Immigration Health Services, now known as IHSC 
DOT  directly observed therapy 
DOTS  directly observed therapy short-course  
EOIR  Executive Office for Immigration Review 
FY  fiscal year 
GAO  Government Accountability Office 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HHS  U.S. Health and Human Services 
ICE  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IGRA  interferon-gamma release assay  
IGSA  inter-governmental service agreement 
IHSC  Immigration Health Services Corp, a part of ICE 
INA  Immigration and Nationality Act 
INS  Immigration and Naturalization Service 
ISAP  Intensive Supervision Appearance Program 
LTBI  latent tuberculosis infection 
MDR-TB multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 
m-health mobile health  
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
OIG  Office of the Inspector General 
 xiv 
PBNDS Performance Based National Detention Standards 
PHSP  Public Health, Safety, and Preparedness Unit 
SPC  service processing center 
TB  tuberculosis 
TST  tuberculin skin test 
U.S.C.  United States Code  




A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Tuberculosis (TB) is a significant health issue to both the general public and the 
officers who enforce our nation’s immigration laws. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2014 there were 9,241 cases of TB reported in the 
United States, and America spent $435 million treating cases of TB.1 In 2013, 555 people 
in the United States died from TB; however, the burden in the rest of the world is much 
higher. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “About one third of the 
world’s population is infected with tuberculosis (TB) bacteria.”2 The WHO also reported, 
“Globally, 5% of TB cases were estimated to have had multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-
TB) in 2014.”3  
U.S. immigration officers encounter people infected with TB while enforcing the 
nation’s immigration laws. The current immigration enforcement policies of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are laid out in Policies for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (hereafter “the 2014 DHS 
policy”), issued on November 20, 2014 by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson.4 The 2014 DHS 
policy made the apprehension of aliens attempting to cross the border illegally and aliens 
convicted of felony offenses some of DHS’s top immigration enforcement priorities. The 
incidence of TB along the U.S. border with Mexico is higher than the general rate for 
either country, and incarcerated populations are at an enhanced risk for TB infection. 
Thus, while the 2014 DHS policy does not directly address infectious diseases, an 
unintended consequence of the policy is that the DHS enforcement priorities include 
categories of aliens known to be at increased risk for TB. Does the current policy make 
                                                 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Take on TB Infographic,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/infographic/pdf/take-on-tuberculosis-infographic.pdf. 
2 Ibid.  
3 World Health Organization, “10 Facts about Tuberculosis,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/tuberculosis/en/.  
4 Department of Homeland Security, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 
Undocumented Immigrants [memo] (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014).  
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TB less of a risk to public health or more of a risk? If the risk is greater due to the current 
policy, then how should that policy be changed? 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Should the United States alter its immigration enforcement policies to address 
more directly the threat that tuberculosis poses to public health? 
C. METHOD 
This thesis uses policy options analysis to assess whether the U.S. should change 
its immigration enforcement policies to address more directly the threat that tuberculosis 
poses to public health. A review of the literature on immigration and tuberculosis 
suggested three policy options to augment the status quo. The first is to cure TB in 
unlawful immigrants prior to their removal. The second is to increase international 
cooperation between the United States and the receiving country to treat TB after the 
removal of TB infected aliens from the United States. The third is to increase the amount 
of TB testing that the DHS performs on migrants encountered by immigration officers. 
According to the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET), when 
creating a strategy to combat TB, “the first priority is identifying and completely treating 
all persons who have active TB.”5 The optimal policy solution will accomplish this 
objective. 
This thesis does not review all immigration policies, but only immigration 
enforcement policies that directly pertain to addressing the threat of TB. For example, the 
thesis does not review whether or not to require additional TB testing for people legally 
entering the United States with a visitor’s visa, or whether to require additional TB 
testing as a part of the naturalization process.  
                                                 
5 Alan Bloch, “Screening for Tuberculosis and Tuberculosis Infection in High-Risk Populations: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis,” Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report 44, no. RR-11 (1995): 18–34.  
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E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The United States has one of the lowest incidences of TB in the world. The 
countries from which the United States receives the largest numbers of unlawful migrants 
and the countries to which the DHS deports the most people, all have much higher rates 
of TB. This indicates that a higher rate of TB is to be expected in the people encountered 
by DHS immigration officers, and also that the United States achieves more optimal TB 
treatment outcomes. Statistics from the DHS show that as many as one quarter of all 
aliens removed from the United States return. The United States maintains a clear public 
health interest in treating aliens with TB disease who are in the removal process until that 
disease is cured. It is also necessary to completely treat TB because improper or 
incomplete treatment of TB disease can result in a return to a contagious state, acquired 
drug resistance, transmission of the disease to others, and poor outcomes, including 
death. 
The incidence of TB among the foreign-born in the United States is 12 times 
greater than that of the general population, and the incidence in U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody is as much as 33 times greater. Current TB-related 
immigration enforcement policies address TB disease to control infection in a congregate 
living setting, such as detention centers. Aliens are tested for TB during the intake 
process at detention centers, and aliens with TB disease are treated until they are no 
longer contagious, but not necessarily cured, before removal from the Unite States. 
Detection and treatment of TB are complicated due to detention facilities operating under 
different detention standards.  
Current policies neither detect all cases of active TB nor treat to completion all 
cases of active TB. It is, therefore, necessary to change U.S. immigration enforcement 
policies to achieve the TB control objective. No single policy change will achieve the 
optimal policy outcome. Instead, two of the options must be implemented at the same 
time: cure TB prior to removal and increase TB testing. While universal testing of all 
encountered aliens would be the most effective option, it would also be both expensive 
and difficult to implement. Instead, the recommended policy changes should be applied 
to aliens either in ICE detention or released from detention. ICE’s Alternatives to 
 xviii 
Detention (ATD) program should be used to help alleviate potential legal issues with 
continued detention of aliens so that they may receive treatment for TB disease. At the 
same time, the DHS must arm its employees against TB. Training on TB signs and 
symptoms should be delivered to DHS immigration officers, and officers should also be 
made aware that the CDC recommends periodic TB testing for certain professions, 
including correctional and healthcare workers. 
There are many barriers to implementing these policy changes. Increased testing 
would require additional funding, equipment, personnel, and facilities. The DHS is only 
able to pay for and provide treatment case management for aliens in custody. Once 
released from custody the burden falls upon the public health system having jurisdiction 
over the alien’s place of residence. Increased testing would result in an increase in the 
number of TB cases in the public health system, and additional research is necessary to 
determine if the public health system is able to cope with this increase. It is possible that 
both the public health system and the general public would not view this increase 
favorably. There would also be many logistical challenges to delivering healthcare to 
aliens not in detention even if they were enrolled in ATD. For example, the alien may 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Tuberculosis (TB) is a significant health issue to both the public and the officers 
who enforce our nation’s immigration laws. According to the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), in 2014 there were 9,241 cases of TB reported in the United 
States, and America spent $435 million treating cases of TB.1 In 2013, 555 people in the 
United States died from TB.2 The burden in the rest of the world is much higher. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “About one third of the world’s 
population is infected with tuberculosis (TB) bacteria.”3 The WHO also reported, 
“Globally, 5% of TB cases were estimated to have had multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-
TB) in 2014.”4  
U.S. immigration officers will encounter people infected with TB while enforcing 
the nation’s immigration laws. The current immigration enforcement policies of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are laid out in Policies for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (hereafter “the 2014 DHS 
policy”), issued on November 20, 2014 by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson. The 2014 DHS 
policy made the apprehension of aliens attempting to cross the border illegally and aliens 
convicted of felony offenses some of DHS’s top immigration enforcement priorities.5 
The incidence of TB along the U.S. border with Mexico is higher than the general rate for 
                                                 
1 Centers for Disease Control and Prevent, “Take on TB Infographic,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/infographic/pdf/take-on-tuberculosis-infographic.pdf.  
2 Ibid. 
3 World Health Organization [WHO], “10 Facts about Tuberculosis,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/tuberculosis/en/.  
4 World Health Organization, “Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis (MDR-TB): 2015 Update,” accessed 
July 14, 2016, www.who.int/tb/challenges/mdr/mdr_tb_factsheet.pdf. 
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and 
Removal of Undocumented Immigrants [memo] (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2014).  
2 
either country, and incarcerated populations are at an enhanced risk for TB infection.6 
Thus, while the 2014 DHS policy does not directly address infectious diseases, an 
unintended consequence of the policy is that the DHS enforcement priorities include 
categories of aliens known to be at increased risk for TB. Does the current policy make 
TB less of a risk to public health or more of a risk? If the risk is greater due to the current 
policy, then how should that policy be changed?  
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards 
govern the treatment of alien detained by ICE. The most recent standards covering the 
medical care requirements for aliens detained for more than 72 hours are the 2011 
Performance Based National Detention Standards (2011 PBNDS).7 The Immigration 
Health Services Corps (IHSC), a division of ICE, follows the 2011 PBNDS at those 
facilities other than family residential centers, where it directly provides medical 
coverage. However, three other sets of standards are in effect at different detention 
facilities around the country: the 2000 National Detention Standards, the 2008 
Performance Based Detention Standards, the Family Residential Standards.8 This 
multiplicity of care standards greatly complicates ICE’s response to communicable 
diseases. 
The 2011 PBNDS requires that an alien receive a TB screening following CDC 
guidelines within 12 hours of arriving at the detention facility. Either a medical 
professional or a specially trained detention officer may perform the screening. The 
detainee may only be placed in a housing unit once the screening is complete. Detention 
facilities are not required to screen detainees who were in the continuous custody of a law 
                                                 
6 Mark Lobato and J. Peter Cegielski, “Preventing and Controlling Tuberculosis along the US-Mexico 
Border,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 50, no. RR1 (2001): 1–2, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/rr5001a1.htm; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “TB in Correctional 
Facilities in the United States,” last modified September 1, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/populations/
correctional/default.htm.  
7 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], “2011 Operations Manual ICE Performance-
Based National Detention Standards: Part 4.3—Medical Care,” accessed July 13, 2016, www.ice.gov/
detention-standards/2011/. 
8 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], “ICE Detention Standards,” last modified 
February 24, 2012, www.ice.gov/factsheets/facilities-pbnds; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
[ICE], “Family Residential Standards,” accessed July 19, 2016, https://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/
family-residential.  
3 
enforcement agency and who had a documented TB screening less than six months old. 
Aliens who remain in detention for more than a year must receive annual or periodic TB 
tests. Detention facilities are also required to conduct a comprehensive health 
examination within 14 days of arrival. This comprehensive assessment includes both 
physical and mental health screenings and must be performed by a healthcare 
practitioner. However, detention facilities are not required to provide assessments to any 
detainee who has had a documented comprehensive health assessment within the last 90 
days. 
According to the CDC, the rate of TB infection for aliens detained by ICE is 12 
times higher than the rate of infection in the general population.9 If detainees have TB 
symptoms or are believed to have active TB, then they are placed in isolation and tested 
for active TB disease. According to the standard, “Patients with suspected active TB shall 
remain in airborne infection isolation until determined by a qualified provider to be 
noncontagious in accordance with CDC guidelines.”10 
The 2011 PBDNS includes numerous procedural safeguards for managing 
confirmed and suspected cases of active TB.11 For instance, the detention facility must 
report all TB cases to state or local health departments within one day of meeting legally 
required reporting criteria which vary by jurisdiction. The facility must also notify the 
IHSC PHSP (recently re-named the Public Health, Safety, and Preparedness Unit or 
PHSP) and provide biographical information, a case summary report, and a treatment 
status and start date. The detention facility must notify the IHSC PHSP of any 
hospitalizations, facility transfers, releases, or removals of the person with TB. This 
notification helps to coordinate continuity of care if ICE releases the detainee from 
custody before removal and to enlist local health department assistance in arranging 
continuity of care if the alien is released or removed to another country. Multidrug-
                                                 
9 C. Nolan et al., “Post-detention Completion of Tuberculosis Treatment for Persons Deported or 
Released from the Custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report 52, no. 19 (2003): 438–441, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm5219a3.htm.  
10 ICE, “2011 Operations Manual,” 283.  
11 Ibid., 283–284.  
4 
resistant and extensively drug-resistant TB cases must be coordinated with the state or 
local health department to create a customized treatment regimen.12  
The final stage of the process is release from custody or removal from the United 
States. Aliens are educated about their TB treatment and provided with a 15-day supply 
of medications when transferred, released, or removed.13 It is important to note that 
noncontagious is not synonymous with cured. Improper or incomplete treatment of TB 
disease can result in a return to a contagious state, acquired drug resistance, transmission 
of the disease to others, and poor outcomes, including death.14 Deported persons are at 
risk for known factors leading to the creation of drug-resistant TB, factors such as failing 
to take all of their medication or residing in an area where drug-resistant TB is common. 
The CDC recommends directly observed therapy (DOT) for all TB treatment.15 
DOT is a protocol “in which patients are observed to ingest each dose of anti-tuberculosis 
medications, to maximize the likelihood of completion of therapy.”16 It is possible to 
refer a detainee with TB who is released from custody but remains in the community to 
local health officials for continuity of care including DOT.  
Deported aliens encounter an entirely different situation. ICE policy is that 
deportees receive a 15-day supply of medication, but 15 days is a small fraction of the 
time necessary to cure TB.17 Treatment of TB disease can take between six and 24 
months depending on drug resistance and other factors.18 Detention facilities are required 
to coordinate through the IHSC PHSP to help ensure continuity of care for TB positive 
aliens removed from the United States. This is normally done through a referral to the 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 283.  
13 Ibid., 283, 297.  
14 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Treatment for TB Disease,” last modified 
April 5, 2016, http://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/treatment/tbdisease.htm. 
15 American Thoracic Society, “Treatment of Tuberculosis,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
52, no. RR11 (2003): 1–77.  
16 Ibid. The World Health Organization uses the term directly observed therapy, short-course (DOTS) 
instead of directly observed therapy (DOT). For consistency with the CDC, the term DOT is used 
throughout this thesis. 
17 ICE, “2011 Operations Manual.”  
18 CDC, ‘Treatment for TB Disease.” 
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health department in the receiving country. ICE has no authority to enforce this referral 
either on the part of the alien or the part of the foreign government or health department. 
Once in their country of origin aliens may travel to or reside in a location where they 
have limited access to healthcare, have limited funding to buy medication and pay for 
treatment, or cease treatment if they do not feel sick. 
Removal from the United States, particularly for citizens of Central America and 
others who illegally cross the U.S. border with Mexico, however, does not mean that the 
alien will never again be a member of an American community. For example, in fiscal 
year (FY) 2014, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Border Patrol 
removed 205,058 persons. Of those, 54,115, slightly more than one-quarter of aliens 
arrested, had been previously removed from the United States.19 According to one CDC 
report, “During January 2000–March 2001, CURE-TB reported that 25% of TB patients 
deported to Latin America with known follow-up returned to the United States (K. 
Moser, San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, personal communication, 
2001).”20 The United States maintains a clear public health interest in aliens with TB 
until the disease is cured regardless of whether they will be removed from the United 
States.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Should the United States alter its immigration enforcement policies to address 
more directly the threat that tuberculosis poses to public health? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section reviews the objective and boundaries of the research used in this 
thesis. It also defines the optimal policy solution against which the policy options 
presented in this thesis are evaluated. 
                                                 
19 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE], ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations 
Report Fiscal Year 2014 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 8. 
20 Nolan et al., “Post-detention Completion.”  
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1. Objective 
This thesis uses policy options analysis to assess whether the United States should 
change its immigration enforcement policies to address more directly the threat that 
tuberculosis poses to public health. It is necessary to review policies about both 
immigration enforcement and tuberculosis to accomplish this objective. Laws and 
policies concerning immigration enforcement are the exclusive provinces of the federal 
government. The amended U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (Title 8 of the U.S. 
Code) provides the specific set of laws applying to apprehension, detention, and removal 
of aliens from the United States. The policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, and its agencies, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, direct the application of the law. 
There are laws and policies concerning tuberculosis and infectious disease, in 
general, at all levels of government. Even though federal regulations, such 42 U.S. Code 
§ 264 Regulations to Control Communicable Diseases, normally take precedence over 
state statutes, there are instances where federal policy defers to local law. For example, 
the ICE 2011 Performance Based Detention Standards Part 4.3 Medical Care contains a 
requirement that detention facilities, “Manage infectious diseases and report them to local 
and/or state health departments in accordance with established guidelines and applicable 
laws.”21 
Infectious diseases do not stop at borders. A review of some the public health 
policies and practices of other countries is necessary to provide an accurate evaluation of 
the effects of U.S. policy options. For example, Mexico inoculates its citizens against TB 
while the United States does not. Mexico also uses a different population sample and 
method to test for drug-resistant TB than does the United States. Therefore, the two 
countries could experience very different results from the same policy change. Additional 
information on international TB is in Chapters II and VI. 
                                                 
21 ICE, “2011 Operations Manual.”  
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2. Boundaries of the Research 
This thesis does not review all immigration policies, but only immigration 
enforcement policies that directly pertain to addressing the threat of TB. For example, the 
thesis does not review whether or not to require additional TB testing for people legally 
entering the United States with a visitor’s visa or whether to require additional TB testing 
as a part of the naturalization process. However, there is overlap between legal and illegal 
immigration. If legal visitors stay in the United States longer than permitted by their visa, 
then they become subject to immigration enforcement. Legal migrants convicted of a 
crime might also be rendered deportable. Moreover, there are also more nuanced 
categories of people, such as those seeking political asylum in the United States. Asylum 
seekers are frequently detained for a least some period during the asylum process and 
thus are subject to ICE detention policies on healthcare. 
It is not practical to study tuberculosis policies in every country in the world or 
even every American state. International consideration for this theses focuses on Mexico, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, China, India, and Russia. Mexico is included due to 
its border with the United States and the importance of the border as an epidemiological 
region. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are included because they are among the 
top five sources of unauthorized immigrants in the United States, along with Mexico and 
India.22 Drug-resistant TB occurs all over the world, but the highest numbers of multi-
drug resistant TB cases occur in China, India, and Russia.23 
3. Defining the Optimal Policy Solution 
According to the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET), 
when creating a strategy to combat TB, “the first priority is identifying and completely 
                                                 
22 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14 
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/11/18/chapter-2-
birthplaces-of-u-s-unauthorized-immigrants/.  
23 Steve Olson, Elizabeth English, and Anne Claiborne, The New Profile of Drug-Resistant 
Tuberculosis in Russia: A Global and Local Perspective: Summary of a Joint Workshop (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2011), 9. 
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treating all persons who have active TB.”24 The optimal policy solution achieves this 
objective. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This policy options analysis of immigration enforcement and tuberculosis relies 
heavily on a review of the existing literature. The review begins with an overview of the 
disease tuberculosis, current trends with the disease, populations of special concern, and 
geographic areas of special concern. People in custody comprise one such population of 
concern, and this subject receives a section in the review. The border between the United 
States and Mexico is an area of particular geographic concern due to the frequency with 
which people cross the border both legally and illegally. The literature review presents an 
in-depth review of cross-border travel and social factors involved in tuberculosis 
treatment. Strategies to deal with TB form the backbone of the thesis and thus receive a 
detailed examination in the literature review. The literature review also includes a section 
on TB cases studies because individual cases illuminate particular points, such as the 
transmission of tuberculosis from person to person and the creation of drug-resistance 
due to improper treatment. Finally, the review covers gaps in the current literature on TB 
as it relates to immigration enforcement policy.  
1. The State of Tuberculosis in 2016 
There is universal consensus on the worldwide state of TB in 2016: TB is 
decreasing in developed countries, increasing in developing countries, and drug-resistant 
forms of TB are increasing worldwide. There is one definitive source on the subject: the 
World Health Organization (WHO). The world TB situation has changed drastically in 
the last two decades. In 1993, the WHO declared TB a “world health emergency.”25 In 
2006, the WHO released the Stop TB Strategy;26 the goal of the strategy was to 
                                                 
24 Alan Bloch, “Screening for Tuberculosis and Tuberculosis Infection in High-Risk Populations: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis,” Morbidity and Mortality 
Weekly Report 44, no. RR-11 (1995): 18–34.  
25 John Grange and Alie Zumla, “The Global Emergency of Tuberculosis: What is the Cause?,” The 
Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health 122, no. 2 (2002): 78–81.  
26 World Health Organization, “Tuberculosis (TB): The End TB Strategy,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.who.int/tb/strategy/en/. 
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“drastically reduce the global burden of TB by 2015.”27 In 2015, the WHO declared that 
this goal had been achieved.28 Despite gains against the disease, the literature shows that 
TB is still one of the world’s primary public health concerns. 
The Global Tuberculosis Report published by the WHO every year since 1997 is 
the definitive source for worldwide TB statistics. A frequently cited WHO statistic is that 
one-third of the world’s population has TB.29 According to the Global Tuberculosis 
Report 2014, in 2013, nine million people developed TB, 1.5 million people died from 
the disease, and 480,000 developed multidrug-resistant TB.30 A particularly alarming 
statistic is that the number of multidrug-resistant TB cases in 2013 was three times the 
number of 2009. Multiple sources have noted that although the worldwide incidence of 
TB is on the decline, the incidence of drug-resistant TB, multidrug-resistant TB, and 
extensively-drug resistant TB are on the increase.31 No region of the world is free from 
TB, but the greatest prevalence of TB cases are in southeast Asia and Africa.32  
The TB picture in the United States matches the pattern in the rest of the world in 
that TB is on the decline. The incidence of TB in the United States has been steadily 
falling since 1990, and in 2013 was 4.1 cases per 100,000 people.33 According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), there were 13,299 new cases of TB in 
                                                 
27 Ibid.  
28 WHO, “10 Facts about Tuberculosis.”  
29 WHO, “10 Facts About Tuberculosis;” Malaria and TB: Implementing Proven Treatment and 
Eradication Methods: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and 
International Operations: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg20915/content-
detail.html.  
30 World Health Organization, Global Tuberculosis Report 2014 (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health 
Organization, 2014), 14. 
31 Malaria and TB; Jaqueline Achkar et al., “Differences in Clinical Presentation among Persons with 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis: A Comparison of Documented and Undocumented Foreign-Born to US-Born 
Persons,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 47, no. 10 (2008): 1277–1283.  
32 Ibid. 





the United States in 2007, half of the number of new TB cases in 1993.34 However, this 
does not mean that TB is no longer a public health concern in the United States. 
Even as the national TB rate has decreased in the United States, the percentage of 
TB cases among the foreign-born population has increased. In 2008, a study of one public 
hospital in New York City found that almost 70 percent of people treated for TB were 
foreign-born, and more than half of those were undocumented migrants.35 In 2009, the 
Chicago Tribune noted that in 2007, for the first time, the majority of TB cases in 
Chicago were among the foreign-born population.36 In addition, a 2009 study found that 
the rate of newly diagnosed TB infections in the foreign-born population was nearly 10 
times higher than in the native population.37 According to the CDC, “In 2007, persons 
born in Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam, and India accounted for over half of the U.S. TB 
cases among foreign-born persons.”38 By 2012, the percentage had increased to 63.39 The 
Migrant Clinicians Network noted that in 2008 the rate of TB in the foreign-born 
population was ten times higher than that of the U.S. born population.40 
One region of special concern in the United States is the area along the border 
with Mexico. Tuberculosis rates in the border region are higher than the general rate in 
either country. For example, one article noted that TB rates in McAllen, Texas are three 
times higher than the national average.41 The same article noted that TB rates in the 
                                                 
34 Oscar Avila and Margaret Ramirez, “Health Departments Fight Tuberculosis on both Sides of the 
U.S. Border with Mexico: Mexican Immigrants Often Contract the Disease before Entering US, Bringing It 
North to Cities Like Chicago, Officials Say,” Chicago Tribune, February 6, 2009, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-02-16/news/0902150175_1_tb-tuberculosis-border.  
35Achkar et al., “Differences in Clinical Presentation.” 
36 Avila and Ramirez, “Health Departments Fight Tuberculosis.”  
37 Yecai Liu et al., “Overseas Screening for Tuberculosis in US—Bound Immigrants and Refugees,” 
New England Journal of Medicine 360, no. 23 (2009): 2406–2415.  
38 R. Pratt et al., “Trends in Tuberculosis—United States, 2007,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report 57, no. 11 (2008): 281–285, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5711a2.htm.  
39 Jamie Morano et al., “Latent Tuberculosis Infection Screening in Foreign-Born Populations: A 
Successful Mobile Clinic Outreach Model,” American Journal of Public Health 104, no. 8 (2014): 1508–
1515.  
40 Joan Combellick, Ed Zuroweste, and Francesca M. Gany. “TBNet: The Impact of an Innovative 
Public-Private Intervention on Tuberculosis Control among an Internationally Mobile Population,” Journal 
of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 9, no. 3 (2011): 229–241.  
41 Avila and Ramirez, “Health Departments Fight Tuberculosis.”  
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border state of Tamaulipas, Mexico there was a 10 percent increase in TB cases between 
2007 and 2009.42 Another study showed that in 2009, 77 percent of all TB cases in 
California were in the foreign-born population.43  
2. Tuberculosis in Custody 
Incarcerated people are at a higher risk for TB infection than the non-incarcerated 
population.44 This review identified a set of consistent factors for increased TB risk: 
congregate living conditions; frequent movement; cultural barriers, such as social stigma 
and native language; and foreign birth.45 U.S. jails and prisons routinely screen detainees 
for TB during the admission process. A 2001 study by the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP), reviewing intake screening using both a tuberculin skin test (TST) and a chest X-
ray, found that “foreign-born inmates were 5.9 times more likely to have a positive TST 
than U.S. born inmates, and accounted for 60% of recently diagnosed TB cases.”46 The 
use of the chest X-ray in addition to the TST did not affect the incidence of TB but did 
result in inmates and staff being exposed to active TB for less time. 
Detainees in ICE custody are also at a higher risk of TB infection.47 In 2003 
study, the Division of Immigration Health Services (DIHS), now a known as the ICE 
IHSC, estimated that “approximately 150 TB cases are identified annually among INS 
detainees in the INS service processing centers (SPCs) and contract detention 
                                                 
42 Ibid.  
43 Robert Deiss et al., “Influences of Cross-Border Mobility on Tuberculosis Diagnoses and Treatment 
Interruption among Injection Drug Users in Tijuana, Mexico,” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 8 
(2009): 1491–1495.  
44 Deiss et al., “Influences of Cross-Border Mobility;” CDC, “TB in Correctional Facilities.”  
45 CDC, “TB in Correctional Facilities in the United States;” Diana Schneider and Mark Lobato, 
“Tuberculosis Control among People in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Custody,” American 
Journal of Preventive Medicine 33, no. 1 (2007): 9–14; David Saunders et al., “Tuberculosis Screening in 
the Federal Prison System: An Opportunity to Treat and Prevent Tuberculosis in Foreign-Born 
Populations,” Public Health Reports 116, no. 3 (2001): 210–218.  
46 Ibid. 
47 A note on the names of immigration enforcement agencies: The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, or INS, an agency of the Department of Justice, ceased to exist in 2003. It was replaced by three 
agencies in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). 
The acronym INS will be used to refer to the immigration enforcement agency for all literature published 
up to 2003, and ICE or CBP will be used for literature published after 2003. 
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facilities.”48 For clarity, ICE detains aliens in 251 jails and prisons (number as of August 
2013); only 13 of those are SPCs or contract detention facilities.49 The same study 
showed that the incidence of TB at the eight INS SPCs was 12 times higher than the rate 
of TB in the general U.S. population, and was 2.5 times higher than the rate of TB among 
the general foreign-born population in the United States. Another study reviewed TB 
rates for detainees in ICE custody between 2004 and 2005 and concluded the rate of TB 
was 2.5 times higher than that of the general foreign-born population.50 However, this 
study was again limited as it reviewed only those 15 facilities where IHSC directly 
provided healthcare. 
3. The Importance of Social Factors and Cross-Border Travel 
The Migrant Clinicians Network has noted that the public health system was not 
designed to address the problems posed by a highly mobile population.51 Moreover, 
multiple sources noted that the border is one extended community, with patients 
frequently crossing both legally and illegally.52 In addition, several studies remarked on 
factors relating to immigrant status, both legal and illegal, and how it can provide barriers 
to TB identification and treatment. Inadequate access to healthcare for immigrants, 
whether in the United States or their home country, was a consistent theme. One study 
noted,  
…despite the availability of free TB treatment in the United States and a 
96% coverage rate by Directly Observed Treatment Short-Course (DOT) 
in Mexico, patients without long-term healthcare insurance will find the 
long treatment challenging, perhaps deal with drug resistance, and 
potentially return to or visit Mexico and transmit TB to their contacts.53 
                                                 
48 Nolan et al., “Post-detention Completion.”  
49 Rebecca Gambler, Immigration Detention: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management 
and Oversight of Facility Costs and Standards (GAO-15-153) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2014), www.gao.gov/assets/670/666467.pdf, 9. 
50 Schneider and Lobato, “Tuberculosis Control.”  
51 Combellick, Zuroweste, and Gany, “TBNet.”  
52 Avila and Ramirez, “Health Departments Fight Tuberculosis;” Deiss et al., “Influences of Cross-
Border Mobility;” Joseph Fitchett, Antonio Vallecillo, and Clara Espitia, “Tuberculosis Transmission 
across the United States-Mexico Border,” Pan American Journal of Public Health 29, no. 1 (2011): 57–60.  
53 Ibid.  
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Many facets of cross-border TB are explored in-depth in the literature. For 
instance, the University of California, San Diego conducted a study looking specifically 
at the population of injection drug users in Tijuana, Mexico.54 While this is a very 
specific cohort, the results were consistent with the literature on the larger population of 
border region residents with TB. The study emphasized the repeated cross-border 
movement of TB patients, including those previously deported from the United States. 
One finding of the study was that injection drug users who reported travel to the United 
States at some point, and those previously deported from the United States showed much 
higher rates of latent TB infection than those who did not report cross-border travel. 
Although this study is only six years old, it cites many statistics pertaining to the high 
percentage of Mexican TB patients that may no longer be current due to the changing 
migration patterns in the United States. 
A University of Arizona, Tucson study specifically examining social factors 
reviewed the cases of several female immigrants living on the U.S. border with Mexico. 
The study cited the difficulties in treating latent TB infection due to different cultural 
perceptions of the disease and the power imbalance between the United States and 
Mexico. Additionally, the study pointed out that Mexican children routinely receive a 
tuberculosis vaccine, and the women believed that anyone so inoculated should not be 
able to get TB.55 A study of TB patients in Chiapas (a state in southern Mexico) also 
identified cultural perceptions, including those about traditional versus modern medicine, 
as a barrier to the completion of TB treatment.56 
The Yale School of Medicine published a study looking at using a mobile medical 
clinic to provide healthcare services, including TB screening, to impoverished 
neighborhoods, including a large population of undocumented migrants in New Haven, 
                                                 
54 Ibid.  
55 Marylyn Morris and Joyceen Boyle, “Resistance, Health, and Latent Tuberculosis Infection: 
Mexican Immigrants at the US-Mexico Border,” Research and Theory for Nursing Practice: An 
International Journal 32, no. 3 (2007): 185–197.  
56 Ivett Reyes-Guillen et al., “Anti-Tuberculosis Treatment Defaulting: An Analysis of Perceptions 
and Interactions in Chiapas, Mexico,” Salud Publica De Mexico 50, no. 3 (2008): 251–257.  
14 
Connecticut.57 This study was remarkable for two reasons: 1) the location was far from 
the U.S. border with Mexico and 2) the study reviewed the prevalence of latent TB 
infection (LTBI), not just active TB disease. The study identified many variables directly 
associated with higher incidence of LTBI, including country of birth (foreign-born people 
were more likely to have LTBI), sex (males were more likely to have LTBI), ethnicity 
(the Hispanic population had a higher incidence of LTBI), and undocumented status.58 
In 2003, the CDC reported on how various social and legal issues complicated TB 
treatment for aliens released from INS custody. The study specifically looked at 
difficulties created by the INS deporting detainees before the completion of their TB 
treatments.59 Furthermore, the report noted, “Deportation before treatment completion 
allows for the export and re-import of TB into the United States, thus placing other 
detainees, law enforcement officials, and communities in the country of origin and in the 
United States at increased risk for exposure to persons with infectious TB.”60 The report 
also noted from January 2000 to March 2001, CureTB (from the San Diego Health and 
Human Services Agency) reported 25 percent of Latin American deportees with known 
TB follow-up returned to the United States.61 
4. Strategies for Addressing TB in the Immigrant Population 
This literature review identified three strategies for addressing TB in the legal and 
illegal immigrant population. The first strategy is to increase TB testing of immigrants, 
and the second strategy is to increase international cooperation in managing TB treatment 
for deported persons. Finally, the third strategy is to cure aliens of TB before returning 
them to their country of origin. 
The methodology for detecting TB in the immigrant population has changed as 
the worldwide TB situation has changed. From 1991 to 2007, CDC technical instructions 
                                                 
57 Morano et al., “Latent Tuberculosis Infection Screening.”  
58 Ibid.  
59 Nolan et al., “Post-Detention Completion.”  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid. 
15 
required chest X-rays for people migrating to the United States, with follow-up testing for 
those with positive X-ray diagnoses. Testing was limited as it was required only for 
people over 15 years of age. In 2007, the CDC began recommending that children 
between the two and 14 years of age receive TB skin tests if they were from countries 
with high rates of TB infection. It also changed the type of follow-up test administered 
for people with positive tests.62  
Several studies showed positive results from increased testing. This strategy 
applies equally to people applying for legal migration to the United States and 
undocumented migrants encountered through the criminal justice system or immigration 
enforcement. A 2001 study by the University of Colorado found that testing all 
immigrants to the United States for TB was both cost effective and efficient at reducing 
TB rates in the United States.63 The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) published a study 
in 2001 wherein the BOP screened every new prisoner admitted through a San Diego 
detention center for TB using a chest X-ray in addition to a skin test. The study 
concluded that the universal use of chest X-rays was not more effective at detecting TB, 
but it did reduce the amount of time that inmates were exposed to potentially contagious 
TB.64  
Australia is in a similar situation to the United States regarding the incidence of 
TB. Australia has one of the lowest TB rates in the world, and almost all TB cases come 
from its foreign-born population. A study by the Victorian Infectious Disease Service 
showed that testing all migrants for TB infection and then treating any positive cases was 
extremely effective but inefficient and costly. As an alternative, it suggested only testing 
                                                 
62 Drew Posey et al., “Implementation of New TB Screening Requirements for U.S. -Bound 
Immigrants and Refugees 2007–2014,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 63, no. 11 (2014): 234–
236.  
63 Michael Greenwood and Watson Warriner, “Immigrants and the Spread of Tuberculosis in the 
United States: A Hidden Cost of Immigration,” Population Research & Policy Review 30, no. 6 (2011): 
839–859.  
64 Saunders et al., “Tuberculosis Screening.”  
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migrants from countries with a high incidence of TB. This strategy was less efficient but 
also far less costly.65 
There are many downsides to focusing on increasing testing. For instance, 
potential immigrants must pay for their health screening; this is a potential barrier to the 
economically disadvantaged.66 The CDC works with the U.S. State Department to train 
physicians in countries with inadequate medical infrastructures and high incidences of 
TB to perform the necessary tests.67 In many countries, facilities must be developed to 
both perform and evaluate the TB testing. In addition, drugs to treat TB must be available 
in sufficient supply to treat positive cases. However, testing programs will not include the 
millions of undocumented immigrants in the United States who are never encountered by 
the justice system or by immigration enforcement authorities. Aliens with latent TB 
infection are permitted to travel to the United States without restriction, although the 
literature shows that they are at an increased risk for developing active TB.68 The United 
States does not test visitors for TB, nor does it test legal residents who return home after 
migrating.69 Finally, there are many logistical difficulties to be overcome if the DHS 
were to test all aliens apprehended by CBP or ICE. Chapter VII discusses these 
challenges in depth. Mexican citizens apprehended at the U.S. border with Mexico are 
frequently returned to Mexico the same day, thus making testing impossible. Many others 
are arrested and placed in custody and a TB skin test is performed, but they are then 
released from detention before someone evaluates the results of the skin test. 
There is not universal agreement on the efficacy of increased TB testing for 
migrants. One study showed that if the United States paid for Mexico to expand its 
Directly Observed Therapy Short-Course program, it would not only cost less than 
                                                 
65 Justin T. Denholm, and Emma S. McBryde, “Can Australia Eliminate TB? Modeling Immigration 
Strategies for Reaching MDG Targets in a Low-Transmission Setting,” Australian & New Zealand Journal 
of Public Health 38, no. 1 (2014): 78–82.  
66 Liu et al., “Overseas Screening for Tuberculosis.”  
67 Nolan et al., “Post-detention Completion.”  
68 Liu et al., “Overseas Screening for Tuberculosis.”  
69 K. Schwartzman et al., “Domestic Returns from Investment in the Control of Tuberculosis in Other 
Countries,” New England Journal of Medicine 2005, no. 353 (2005): 1008–1020.  
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treating Mexican migrants for TB in the United States, but it would also be more 
effective than increased testing.70 The study points out that looking solely at Mexican 
immigrants is not the same as looking at the larger universe of immigrants due to the 
different rates of TB in different parts of the world. 
The second strategy is through increased international cooperation. This strategy 
again applies primarily to illegal migration. In 2001, the CDC noted, “One of the most 
challenging tasks in managing TB among detainees is the coordination of care during the 
post-detention period in the United States or in the patients’ countries of origin.”71 In 
November 2002, the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) 
recommended that a working group be formed to review problems with post-detention 
TB treatment of aliens released or removed by the INS.72 ACET suggested that removal 
should only occur after the “responsible state TB controller” approved a treatment plan, 
including verifying that necessary treatment is available at the destination. ACET also 
suggested referring cases to international TB referral programs such as TBNet and 
CureTB. In 2005, ICE began referring cases to TBNet and CureTB.73 
TBNet, created by the Migrant Clinicians Network in 1996, provides continuity of 
care through case management of highly mobile TB patients, such as deportees.74 
According to TBNet, most alien patients only receive eight weeks of therapy before 
departing the United States. Such deportees usually make at least three major moves: 
from the population to a detention center, from the detention center to their country of 
origin, and from their place of arrival to their home in their country of origin. TBNet uses 
a caseworker to keep in telephone contact with the deported patient and with their 
healthcare provider to ensure that the patient is continuing treatment. In a 2011 report, 
TBNet claimed an 85 percent rate of successful completion of treatment for all cases 
                                                 
70 Ibid.  
71 Saunders et al., “Tuberculosis Screening.”  
72 Nolan et al., “Post-detention Completion.”  
73 Combellick, Zuroweste, and Gany, “TBNet;” Schneider and Lobato, “Tuberculosis Control.”  
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referred to TBNet between May 1, 2005 and February 28, 2008.75 Five percent refused to 
continue treatment, and 10 percent were lost to follow-up. Referred deportees with multi-
drug-resistant TB had a 50 percent treatment success rate. One limitation of the TBNet 
study is that ICE refers “most but not all” TB cases of deportees before removal. This is 
because it is the detention facility that makes this referral. Facilities, where IHSC does 
directly provide medical care, may or may not use the referral services.76 ICE referred 
Mexican nationals deported from states other than Texas and New Mexico to CureTB 
instead of TBNet.  
Results cited by CureTB are different than the figures reported by TBNet. In 
2009, a report by CureTB stated:  
Our results are consistent with early assessments of outcomes among TB 
patients in ICE custody. We found that 80% of all TB patients were 
enrolled in an international TB referral program, with 58% completing 
treatment and 23% either lost to follow-up or with no reported outcome.77 
In addition to reporting different figures, TBNet and CureTB also use different 
measures for case outcomes. For instance, TBNet counts case completion using treatment 
outcome results reported by the national TB program in the alien’s home country. In 
contrast, CureTB verifies treatment completion by reviewing DOT records and counting 
doses administered.78 
The third strategy is to cure aliens’ TB in the United States before their removal. 
In 2002, ACET proposed that a working group look at curing aliens’ TB before release or 
removal.79 There is no literature available concerning such a review. Instead, the 
literature shows the lengths to which the DHS is willing to go to avoid just such a 
scenario. For example, one case study reviewed a 2006 incident where Honduras was 
temporarily unable to acquire drugs to treat TB. ICE was prepared to deport 30 
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Hondurans with active TB when the shortage happened. Rather than continuing to treat 
the Hondurans in the United States, ICE arranged for officials of the Honduran TB 
program to meet with the deportees on their arrival and directly provided the necessary 
drugs to the government of Honduras.80 
5. Case Studies in the TB Literature 
There are many published papers containing case studies involving immigrants 
and TB. The case studies involve both legal and illegal migrants, and they demonstrate 
the additional risks created by international mobility. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reviewed the DHS’s response to a Mexican non-immigrant visitor to the 
United States who legally crossed the U.S. border with Mexico more than 20 times 
during a two-month period in 2007, despite CBP having been notified that the man had 
infectious TB and a history of non-compliance with treatment.81 The GAO concluded 
that the DHS’s poor ability to coordinate with state and local health officials was a cause 
for concern. 
The studies highlight one of the main reasons that TB is a public health concern: 
any person with infectious TB is at risk of transmitting the disease to any person who 
shares air space with the carrier. One study illustrating this problem concerned a man 
who was deported from the United States and referred to CureTB for continuity of care. 
The man, a Mexican citizen, both sold and used methamphetamines. He was lost to 
treatment for two years. By the time he was re-located, health officials had discovered 
that he had infected at least six people including his child.82 
An article in the Wall Street Journal demonstrated the difficulty in obtaining TB 
care on the Mexican side of the U.S. border with Mexico. The article concerned a man 
who frequently crossed the U.S. border with Mexico and had a dangerous form of TB: 
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multidrug-resistant TB. Even though the man sought medical care, it took more than a 
year for him to be diagnosed and begin treatment.83  
The literature also shows the difficulty of tracing the path of international travel. 
The most dangerous form of TB is extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB). The Wall 
Street Journal ran an article on the one man, who is known to have XDR-TB, arrested by 
CBP.84 Even though CBP arrested the man when he attempted to cross the U.S. border 
with Mexico, he was from Nepal. He is known to have traveled through 13 countries, 
including Brazil and Mexico. It is impossible to locate every person with whom he had 
contact, and this is particularly alarming because every one of them was at risk of 
contracting the deadly disease. 
6. Gaps in the Literature on TB 
There is very limited information available on the incidence of TB among 
America’s immigration officers as a result of job-related TB exposure. A review of the 
topic revealed only a single published report, although it was published in multiple 
forms.85 That report concerned two reviews of ICE processing facilities performed by the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a division of the CDC. 
The study showed that ICE employees had received no training on TB and did not know 
that ICE recommends periodic TB testing. Employee participation in the study was poor, 
and it is not possible to draw wider conclusions on the prevalence of TB among ICE 
employees based on this study other than to recognize that ICE employees who encounter 
TB positive aliens are at risk of TB infection. 
                                                 
83 Betsy McKay, “Risk of Deadly TB Exposure Grows Along US-Mexico Border,” Wall Street 
Journal, March 9, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323293704578336283658347240.  
84 Betsy McKay, “Dangerous TB Patient Detained on U.S. Border,” Wall Street Journal, March 2, 
2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323978104578332461533970412.  
85 Marie De Perio, R. Todd Niemeier, and Maureen T. Neimeier, “TB Exposures among Immigration 
Employees,” American Jails 27, no. 1 (2013): 24–28; Marie De Perio, R. Todd Niemeier, and Matthew 
Groenewold, “The Effectiveness of Using Interferon-gamma Release Assays in Screening Immigration 
Employees for Latent Tuberculosis Infection,” International Journal of Occupational and Environmental 
Health 17, no. 4 (2011): 322–327.  
21 
Both immigration to the United States and the global picture on TB are changing 
rapidly. This requires review of the literature with particular attention paid to the date of 
publication and cognizance of what conditions have changed since that time. For 
example, a report issued in 2009 may be based on migration patterns that are no longer 
current. Similarly, a 2006 report on TB testing might refer to testing algorithms have 
been updated. In another example, a report on deportees and TB issued before 2005 may 
not take into account DHS’s use of international TB referral services.  
Much of the literature concerning the incidence of TB or treatment for TB among 
detained and deported aliens comes either from the Division of Immigration Health 
Services, now IHSC, or an organization such as TBNet, which provides service to the 
IHSC. These studies and reports universally concern the public health and medical 
aspects of TB. There is also information from the Congressional Research Service and 
other sources reviewing the laws relating to public health issues, public health detention 
authorities, and the exclusion of legal migrants.86 There is no literature looking 
specifically at how U.S. immigration enforcement policies intersect with TB. 
E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The thesis opens with in-depth background on tuberculosis in Chapter II. The 
chapter provides additional information for tuberculosis in those countries that have 
extremely high rates of illegal migration to the United States and those countries that 
have high rates of drug-resistant TB. Chapter III provides a layperson’s overview of the 
removal process. This is both to give the reader an idea of the scope of immigration 
enforcement in the United States and to provide an understanding of the timeframes 
involved in the removal process. Chapter IV begins the policy options analysis by 
reviewing the current enforcement and TB policies. Chapter V examines the strategy of 
curing TB before deportation, and Chapter VI analyzes the option of greater international 
cooperation to combat TB in deportees. Chapter VII then covers the pros and cons of 
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performing additional TB testing on illegal migrants encountered by the DHS. Finally, 
Chapter VIII provides the conclusions and recommendations derived from the research 
and analysis.  
23 
II. BACKGROUND ON TUBERCULOSIS 
Before analyzing the policy options concerning immigration enforcement and TB, 
it is necessary to have at least a layperson’s understand of the disease and the threat it 
poses to public health. This chapter begins with a review of TB, including both TB 
disease and TB infection. It then reviews diagnosis and treatment of TB. Because many 
countries use the bacille Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccine, basic information on that 
preventive measure is reviewed. Finally, the current state of TB in the United States and 
selected countries worldwide is presented. 
A. TUBERCULOSIS DISEASE AND INFECTION 
A bacterium named Mycobacterium tuberculosis causes tuberculosis. TB most 
frequently occurs in the lungs (pulmonary TB), but it can infect any part of the body.87 
TB is spread from person to person through the air when someone with TB disease 
exhales or spits, and it is often through coughing.88 In addition, exposure to the bacterium 
can produce two related conditions—active TB disease (hereafter TB or TB disease) and 
latent TB infection (hereafter LTBI or TB infection). 
Tuberculosis is a serious public health concern worldwide. According to the 
World Health Organization, in 2014 10 million people developed TB, 1.5 million people 
died from the disease, and an estimated 480 thousand developed multidrug-resistant 
TB.89 Additionally, as much as one-third of the world’s population has LTBI.90 Despite 
these terrible statistics, TB is treatable. The WHO estimates that TB treatment saved 43 
million lives between the years 2000 and 2014.91 
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People with TB infection have no symptoms and are not contagious, but they are 
at an increased risk for developing TB disease.92 Although the greatest risk is within two 
years of contracting LTBI, but the disease can become active any time that the person’s 
immune system is compromised. The CDC recommends that people with TB infections 
receive treatment to prevent developing TB disease.93 By way of contrast, people with 
TB disease are infectious and can die if they do not receive treatment. The World Health 
Organization estimates that someone with TB disease can infect 10 to15 people every 
year.94  
Symptoms of TB disease include weight loss, persistent coughing, chest pain, 
coughing up blood, fatigue, fever, night sweats, and loss of appetite.95 Furthermore, the 
presence of other medical conditions can affect TB. According to the CDC, “Medical 
conditions such as diabetes, cancer, and HIV infection alter the immune system’s ability 
to fight TB germs.”96 A coinfection of TB and HIV makes TB even more deadly. In fact, 
a coinfection with TB is one of the primary causes of death for people with HIV.97 
Improper treatment of TB, such as when patients only complete part of their 
course of antibiotics or is prescribed the wrong course of treatment, can lead to the 
development of resistance to the drugs normally used to treat TB. Drug-resistant TB 
comes in several forms, depending on how many drugs to which it is resistant. Drug-
resistant TB is resistant to either isoniazid or rifampin, two of the four frontline 
antibiotics used to treat TB. Multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) is resistant to both 
isoniazid and rifampin. The most problematic form of TB is extensively drug-resistant 
TB (XDR-TB). XDR-TB is resistant to isoniazid and rifampin, fluoroquinolone, and at 
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least one injectable “second line” drug.98 More information on drug-resistant TB is in 
Section 3, Treatment. 
There has been no definitive study on the risk of developing TB based on contact 
with an infected person. Doctors have not determined a safe exposure time for the 
disease; any contact with someone infected with TB has at least a small chance of 
transmission of the disease.99 Studies have identified several risk factors for catching TB 
but not the individual importance of each factor. Known factors include the level of 
infection in the person with TB, duration of contact, proximity of contact, the amount of 
air circulation available during contact, and underlying medical conditions in the 
potential recipient.100 This means that while immigration officers who spend time in 
vehicles, processing centers, and detention centers with people who have TB are at risk of 
infection, it is impossible to quantify that risk. 
B. TESTING AND DIAGNOSIS 
Diagnosing TB can be difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. According to the 
CDC, a complete medical evaluation for TB includes five components:101 
1. Review of the patient’s medical history 
2. A physical examination 
3. Test for the presence of Mycobacteria tuberculosis 
4. Chest X-ray 
5. Laboratory examination of specimens (sputum sample)  
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1. Testing for the Presence of Mycobacteria Tuberculosis 
A blood test (the interferon-gamma release assay or IGRA) or the Mantou 
tuberculin skin test (TST) detects the presence of Mycobacterium tuberculosis; however, 
it detects TB infection, not TB disease.102 Healthcare costs in the United States are 
determined by a myriad of factors and can be difficult to generalize, but one study found 
that a TST program used to screen workers costs $73.20 per person; the IGRA was found 
to be less expensive and cost $54.83 per person.103 A 2011 report by the World Health 
Organization’s Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases 
(TDR) estimated that India conducts 1.5 million TB blood tests every year at a total cost 
of more than $15 million dollars or around $10 per test.104  
During the TST, a patient is injected in the arm with a small amount of fluid 
known as “tuberculin,” and then in 48 to 72 hours the reaction of the arm to the fluid is 
measured with a ruler. A reaction of a certain size is considered a positive test and 
indicates that the patient is infected with TB. An advantage of the TST is that it can be 
given to almost everyone, including children and people with HIV infections.105 The 
main disadvantages of the TST are the timeframe necessary to obtain a result, and the 
necessity for the patient to return to a healthcare provider to have the result measured. 
These disadvantages are not an issue for someone has been detained for removal 
proceedings, but it makes the use of a TST impractical for someone who is arrested and 
then released in less than 48 to 72 hours. Also, while a TST can be given to someone who 
received the BCG vaccine, it is possible that they will have a positive TST even if they 
are not infected with TB, making it necessary to perform further diagnostic tests.  
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The IGRA is a blood test that measures the reaction of a person’s immune system 
to TB bacteria. The CDC recommends that people who have received the BCG vaccine 
be tested with an IGRA instead of a TST.106 However, there is limited information on the 
efficacy of this test for children and people with compromised immune systems.107 Blood 
must be tested within eight to 30 hours after it is drawn, and results can also take eight to 
30 hours. The testing also requires special training, handling, and equipment. This means 
that while the IGRA is usually faster than a TST, it is still not practical for aliens arrested 
and released in less than 72 hours. 
2. Laboratory Examination of Specimens  
Laboratory examination of specimens takes two forms: a sputum smear (also 
referred to as sputum smear microscopy and acid fast bacilli [or AFB] smear), and a 
sputum culture. Sputum is a thick fluid produced in the lungs and air passageways. In 
most low and middle-income countries, sputum smear microscopy is the primary method 
of diagnosing TB disease.108 For a sputum smear, two or more samples of sputum are 
collected from the patient, smeared on a glass slide, stained with acid, and examined 
under a microscope.  
The CDC guidelines for the collection of sputum samples recommend, “At least 
three consecutive sputum specimens are needed, each collected in 8- to 24-hour intervals, 
with at least one being an early morning specimen.”109 If the examiner sees 
mycobacterium in the smear, then the test was “smear positive” or “AFB positive.” The 
sputum smear is inexpensive, easy to perform, and provides results within hours. 
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However, the sensitivity of the test is low. The AFB smear only finds about 50–60 
percent of TB cases.110 It also produces both false positives and false negatives.111 
A sputum culture is performed by growing bacteria derived from sputum samples 
in a solid or liquid nutrient medium and observing the cultures that form. The sputum 
culture has a high specificity and can also be used to detect drug resistance, but it takes 
up to four weeks to obtain a result, and four to six weeks to check drug resistance.112 
3. The Bacille Calmette-Guérin Vaccine 
There is a vaccine available to help prevent tuberculosis infection—the bacille 
Calmette–Guérin (BCG) vaccine. According to the World Health Organization, the BCG 
vaccine is one of the most widely distributed vaccines in the world, but “It does not 
prevent primary infection and, more importantly, does not prevent reactivation of latent 
pulmonary infection, the principal source of bacillary spread in the community.”113 In 
other words, the BCG vaccine does not keep people with LTBI from developing active 
TB. The effect of the vaccine on adolescents and adults has been described by the 
Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis as “variable.”114 The BCG vaccine 
is known to provide protection for up to 15 years, but its effectiveness beyond that 
timespan is unknown.115 Furthermore, the effectiveness of the vaccine decreases with 
time.116 
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C. TREATMENT 
Tuberculosis, whether latent or active, is curable. TB that is not drug-resistant 
(also known as drug-susceptible TB, pan-sensitive TB, or just TB) is most commonly 
treated with a course of four antibiotics that must be taken every day for two months and 
two that must be taken for an additional four to seven months.117 The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) has approved 10 drugs for use in treating TB, but the two 
most commonly used are isoniazid and rifampin.118 According to the CDC, the direct cost 
to treat drug-susceptible TB in 2014 was about $17,000.119 Direct costs include only the 
cost of medicine and the healthcare provider. The addition of indirect costs, such as 
transportation and lost productivity, makes the cost much higher. 
If not treated properly, TB can develop drug-resistance. Historically, people 
tended to complete less than the full course of TB treatment due to factors, such as the 
length of treatment, side effects of treatment, and not feeling ill. The medical community 
developed a protocol known as directly observed therapy or DOT for this reason. The 
concept of DOT is simple: to ensure compliance with treatment a medical professional 
watches the TB patient take each dose of their medication. The CDC recommends that all 
TB patients be treated using the DOT protocol.120 
There are potential side effects to all of the drugs used to treat TB. Those side 
effects are one of the primary reasons that people do not complete TB treatment.121 Side 
effects can include serious conditions such as liver damage, neuropathy, hepatitis, skin 
rash, gastrointestinal disorders, vision changes, and undesirable interactions with other 
drugs.122  
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Of all types of TB, drug-resistant TB is the most difficult, expensive, and time-
consuming to treat. Multidrug-resistant TB requires a daily course of highly toxic 
antibiotics for two years.123 The CDC estimates that MDR-TB costs an estimated 
$150,000 to treat, and XDR-TB could cost more than $482,000 to treat a single patient.124  
Tuberculosis is a complicated disease, and there are social barriers to its treatment 
as well as medical difficulties. Many of these social barriers are acutely present in the 
population of illegal migrants. Such barriers include language difficulties, conflicts with 
religious practices, a stigma associated with TB infection, lack of financial resources, 
poor access to healthcare, frequently changing residences, and an inability to attend DOT 
sessions due to lack of transportation or work schedule.125 
D. TUBERCULOSIS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF INTEREST 
It is not practical to review the current state of TB in every country. This section 
presents statistics for the United States and other countries of interest chosen due to the 
burden of TB in the country, TB control efforts in the country, the number of illegal 
migrants the United States receives from the country, or the number of legal migrants the 
United States receives. The World Health Organization (WHO) is the authoritative source 
for TB statistics worldwide and thus provides many of the statistics cited. 
1. Tuberculosis in the United States 
The United States has a very low burden of TB, and the general incidence of TB 
has been steadily declining in the United States since 1990. According to the WHO, in 
2014 the U.S. incidence of TB was 3.1 cases per 100,000 population.126 In 2014, the 
United States spent about $143 million on its national TB program.127 The United States 
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tests all TB cases for drug resistance and reported an 83percent treatment success rate for 
drug-susceptible TB.128 The number of people with TB infection is much higher than the 
number with TB disease; more 11 million people in the United States are believed to 
have LTBI.129 
The incidence of TB in the United States is not evenly distributed across the 
population. In 2012, 63 percent of the TB cases in the United States were among the 
foreign-born population, and the rate of TB in the foreign-born population was 10 times 
higher than that of the U.S. born population.130 In 2014, there were 9421 new cases of TB 
reported to the CDC, and 66 percent of those were among the foreign-born population.131 
Mexican-born people accounted for the largest number of cases at 1277. Totals from 
selected other countries include El Salvador, 97 cases; Guatemala, 180 cases; Honduras, 
142 cases; China, 421 cases; India, 479 cases; Vietnam, 501 cases; and Philippines, 748 
cases.132 The rate of re-activation, people who previously had TB again developing TB 
disease, is 13 times higher among the foreign-born population in the United States.133 
More than half of the aliens illegally migrating to the United States in 2010 came from 
countries with a high incidence of TB.134 
The United States does not routinely administer the BCG vaccine, nor is it 
recommended by the CDC except for certain infants at high risk of contracting TB.135  
                                                 
128 Ibid.  
129 Diane Bennett et al., “Prevalence of Tuberculosis Infection in the United States Population: The 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1999–2000,” American Journal of Respiratory and 
Critical Care Medicine 177, no. 3 (2008): 248–255.  
130 Morano et al., “Latent Tuberculosis Infection Screening;” Combellick, Zuroweste, and Gany. 
“TBNet.”  
131 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Reported Tuberculosis in the United States: 2014,” 
last modified October 6, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/reports/2014/pdfs/tb-surveillance-2014-
report.pdf. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Kelly Kyanko et al., “Undocumented Immigrants Face a Unique Set of Risks from Tuberculosis 
Treatment: Is This Just?” American Medical Association Journal of Ethics 18, no. 3 (2016): 311–318.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Tuberculosis (TB) Vaccination,” last modified May 
13, 2009, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/tb/default.htm. 
32 
2. Tuberculosis in Mexico 
According to the WHO, the incidence of TB in Mexico is 21 cases per 100,000 
people.136 Mexico spent about $17 million on its national TB program in 2014. In 
addition, Mexico reported 21,881 cases of TB to the WHO in 2014 and reported an 80 
percent success rate in treating new drug-susceptible TB cases.137 However, these 
numbers can be somewhat misleading. Mexico relies primarily on the AFB smear to 
diagnosis TB.138 As cited above, the sensitivity of the sputum smear is only 50 to 60 
percent, and testing is not universal. Mexico also tested less than 1percent of new TB 
cases for drug resistance in 2014. 
Mexico uses the BCG vaccine.139 
3. Tuberculosis in El Salvador 
According to the WHO, the incidence of TB in El Salvador was 41 cases per 
100,000 people in 2014, and El Salvador’s national TB program had an estimated budget 
of $5.1 million.140 Moreover, El Salvador reported 2220 cases of TB to the WHO in 2014 
and tested 54 percent of new cases for drug resistance. El Salvador reported a 93 percent 
successful treatment rate for new drug-susceptible TB in 2014. Also, El Salvador 
primarily uses the sputum smear to diagnose TB.141 
El Salvador uses the BCG vaccine.142 
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4. Tuberculosis in Guatemala 
According to the WHO, in 2014 the incidence of TB in Guatemala was 57 cases 
per 100,000 people, and Guatemala’s TB program had an estimated budget of $11 
million. Guatemala reported 3224 cases of TB to the WHO in 2014 and tested 17 percent 
of new cases for drug resistance. Additionally, Guatemala reported an 84 percent success 
rate for treating new drug-susceptible TB cases in 2014. Guatemala primarily uses the 
sputum smear to diagnose TB.143 
Guatemala uses the BCG vaccine.144 
5. Tuberculosis in Honduras 
According to the WHO, in 2014 the incidence of TB in Honduras was 43 cases 
per 100,000 people, and Honduras’s TB program had an estimated budget of $13 million. 
In 2014, Honduras reported 2820 cases of TB to the WHO and tested six percent for drug 
resistance. Honduras reported an 89 percent success rate for treating new drug-
susceptible TB cases in 2014. Like other Central American countries, Honduras primarily 
uses the sputum smear to diagnose TB.145 
Honduras uses the BCG vaccine.146 
6. Tuberculosis in China 
According to the WHO, in 2014 the incidence of TB in China was 68 cases per 
100,000 people, and China’s TB program had an estimated budget of $340 million. 
Additionally, China reported 826,155 cases of TB to the WHO in 2014 and tested 19 
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percent of new cases for drug resistance. China reported a 95 percent success rate for 
treating new drug-susceptible TB cases in 2014.147  
China is second only to India in the number of new cases of TB each year. The 
WHO estimates that China has nearly one million new cases of TB every year.148 
However, it has made great strides in controlling TB and is one of a small number of 
countries to meet the WHO’s global TB control target by diagnosing at least 80 percent 
of TB cases and treating more than 90 percent of those. China accomplished this feat 
through a nationwide implementation of a DOT program.149 
China uses the BCG vaccine.150 
7. Tuberculosis in India 
According to the WHO, in 2014 the incidence of TB in India was 167 cases per 
100,000 people, and India’s TB program had an estimated budget of $261 million. India 
reported an astounding 1,683,915 cases of TB to the WHO in 2014 and tested only two 
percent of those for drug resistance! India reported an 88 percent success rate for treating 
new drug-susceptible TB cases in 2014. 
In addition, India has the highest known burden of TB in the world, and this has 
implications for U.S. immigration policy. According to a Pew Research Center study, 
citizens of India comprised four percent of the illegal migrants to the United States in 
2012, making India the fourth largest source of illegal migrants.151 Despite the recent 
influx of these migrants, there has been little interaction between the DHS and illegal 
migrants from India. In fiscal year 2015, ICE removed only 311 citizens of India from the 
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United States.152 The reasons for this small number are unknown. One possible 
explanation is that Indian migrants are not being convicted of crimes and thus do not fall 
among the current DHS immigration enforcement priorities. 
India uses the BCG vaccine. 
8. Tuberculosis in Russia 
According to the WHO, in 2014 the incidence of TB in Russia was 84 cases per 
100,000 people, and Russia’s TB program had an estimated budget of nearly $2 billion 
($1,894,000,000). Additionally, Russia reported 136,168 cases of TB to the WHO in 
2014 and tested 84 percent of new cases for drug resistance. Moreover, Russia reported a 
68 percent success rate for treating new drug-susceptible TB cases in 2014.153 Russia 
uses the BCG vaccine.154 
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REMOVAL PROCESS 
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the drawbacks to treating TB is the amount of 
time necessary to diagnose and treat the disease. However, the immigration enforcement 
process typically takes enough time to complete TB treatment. This is particularly true 
for people in removal proceedings who are not detained by the DHS. A layperson’s 
understanding of the removal process will assist in understanding some of the timeframes 
and policy options described in this thesis.  
A. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
The immigration law of the United States is the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(as amended), hereafter known as “the INA,” codified in Title 8 of the United States 
Code. The most recent version of the INA is the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (often referred to as IIRIRA).155 Before March 1, 
2003, the responsibility for enforcing the INA belonged solely to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). The INS was an agency within the Department of Justice, 
and ultimate legal authority under the INA resided in the attorney general. The U.S. 
Border Patrol, although often referred to as an independent entity, was a division of the 
INS. However, with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 
2003, authority over the INA was transferred to the secretary of homeland security. The 
DHS split the INS into three agencies: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS).156 All three agencies now share responsibility for enforcing the INA. CIS 
does not arrest aliens, but it does put people into removal proceedings. Although both 
ICE and CBP arrest aliens, ICE is solely responsible for detaining aliens during the 
removal process. 
                                                 
155 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [INA], Pub. L. No. 104–
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B. INITIATING REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
The removal process begins when an immigration officer encounters an alien. 
That officer could be a Border Patrol agent patrolling the Rio Grande River, an inspector 
at an international airport, an adjudications officer reviewing an application for 
permanent residence, or a deportation officer taking custody of an alien from jail or 
prison. The immigration officer examines the person and decides whether or not he or she 
appears to be removable and if so, by what legal mechanism. To be removable, a person 
must be a citizen of a country other than the United States. Removal consists of two 
distinct legal concepts: inadmissibility and deportability. Before 1996, there were 
separate proceedings for the two, but in 1996, IIRIRA combined both under “removal 
proceedings.” For most purposes in this thesis inadmissibility, removability, and 
deportability (and variations such as remove and deport) can be used interchangeably. 
Legal grounds for inadmissibility are found in the INA § 212, and removability is found 
in INA § 237. Grounds for inadmissibility and removal include such things as being 
convicted of a drug offense, being convicted of a crime of domestic violence, being 
present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, and immigrants 
who do not possess valid visas.157 
Once the immigration officer has decided to place an alien in removal 
proceedings, then the alien is issued a charging document notifying them of the charges 
against them, the possible outcomes of those charges, whether or not they will be 
receiving a hearing, the right to representation, and possible appeal rights. There are 
many types of immigration charging documents:  
• a notice to appear issued under § 236 of the INA  
• a notice of intent to issue a final administrative removal order issued under 
§ 238 of the INA (administrative removal) 
• a notice of intent to issue an expedited removal order under § 235 of the 
INA (expedited removal)  
• a notice of intent to reinstate a final order of removal under § 241 of the 
INA (reinstated removal)  
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• a visa waiver removal under § 217 of the INA (visa waiver removal)  
• a notice to detain, remove, or present alien (depart foreign under 
safeguard) under § 254 of the INA (alien crewman removal).  
The ultimate result of any of these charging documents, removal from the United States, 
is the same, but the legal processes involved are very different. 
C. REMOVAL HEARINGS AND ORDERS OF REMOVAL 
If the DHS issues an alien a notice to appear, then that person must appear before 
an immigration judge. Immigration judges work for the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR), an agency within the Department of Justice.158 Immigration judges 
conduct removal proceedings, including interviewing witnesses, taking testimony, and 
reviewing evidence.159 Aliens may have the attorney of their choice during proceedings, 
but they must pay for their own representation.160 At the end of proceedings, the 
immigration judge may grant the alien a benefit, such as political asylum or permanent 
residence, allow the alien to voluntarily depart the United States, or issue an order of 
removal. Both the alien and the government have the right to appeal the immigration 
judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).161 A decision by the BIA 
may be appealed to the U.S. District Court having jurisdiction over the immigration judge 
who issued the original order. Once in federal court, a removal case has the same appeal 
rights as any other federal court case. 
An order of removal from which no appeal is filed is said to be “final.” If either 
party reserves the right of appeal, then the immigration judge’s order is “stayed” and does 
not become final. If the right of appeal is reserved but no appeal is filed within 30 days, 
then the original order becomes final. If either the alien or the government files an appeal, 
then there is no final order until the BIA rules on the appeal. The immigration judge may 
                                                 
158 U.S. Department of Justice, “Executive Office for Immigration Review,” accessed July 14, 2015, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir.  
159 INA § 240.  
160 INA § 240 (b) (4) (A).  
161 U.S. Department of Justice, “Board of Immigration Appeals,” last modified March 24, 2016, 
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also issue an order of removal if an alien does not appear at his or her hearing as required. 
This is known as an “in absentia” order of removal.162 
There are many paths to removal that do not go through an immigration judge. 
For instance, expedited removal, reinstated removal, administrative removal, visa waiver 
removal, and alien crew removal do not require a hearing before an immigration judge. 
For these types of removals, the alien is issued both a charging document and a removal 
order under the authority of the arresting agency. There is no right of appeal for these 
types of removal orders. Finally, a U.S. district judge may directly issue a removal order 
as part of sentencing any non-citizen defendant convicted of certain crimes. Section 238 
of the INA contains the authority for this action. 
D. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS TIMEFRAMES 
Not only are removal proceedings legally complex, but they also take time. 
According to a report published in 2011 by the Transnational Records Access 
Clearinghouse, the average removal case took 482 days to receive an order from 
EOIR.163 By January 2016 that time had grown to an average of 667 days for each case, 
and there are currently more than 474,000 cases pending before EOIR.164 A 2012 report 
by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that some cases 
took more than five years to complete.165 These numbers are for aliens not in ICE 
custody; aliens in custody are EOIR’s priority.166 EOIR has a self-imposed goal of 
completing cases for aliens detained by DHS in 60 days. According to the 2012 OIG 
                                                 
162 INA § 240(b) (5) (A).  
163 Transnational Records Access Clearinghouse, “New Judge Hiring Fails to Stem Rising 
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164 Transnational Records Access Clearinghouse, “Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases 
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165 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General [DOJ OIG], Management of 
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001) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2012), 
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166 Oversight of the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 1 (2015) (statement of Juan P. Osuna, Director, 
Executive Office for Immigration Review).  
41 
report, in 2010 EOIR met this goal for 85 percent of detained cases.167 Appeals add 
additional time. The BIA took an average of 16 months to decide the appeals for non-
detained aliens, and three and a half months for aliens in detention.168 
It is also possible for an alien to go through removal proceedings more than once. 
For example, one potential outcome of a BIA appeal to is remand proceedings back to an 
immigration judge; this starts the entire cycle over again. Aliens may also file a “motion 
to re-open” a previously decided case.169 If an alien received her or his order of removal 
in absentia and files a motion to re-open, then the order of removal is automatically 
stayed until an immigration judge rules on the motion.170 
E. ASYLUM CLAIMS 
Any alien may assert that she or he is afraid to return to her or his country of 
origin, commonly referred to as claiming asylum, regardless of the charging document 
issued to the alien. If this happens, then the alien is not immediately deported. Instead, he 
or she receives a “credible fear” hearing from a CIS asylum officer. Next, the alien 
receives a hearing with an immigration judge to rule on his or her asylum claim.171 Any 
order of removal issued before the claim is adjudicated, for example in expedited removal 
proceedings, is only executed if the immigration judge rules against the alien’s claim. 
The timeframes listed in Section D: Removal Proceedings Timeframes include the 
adjudication of asylum claims. 
Because the United States receives asylum applications from countries with 
moderate to high burdens of tuberculosis, the demographics of asylum applicants has a 
direct bearing on the intersection of U.S. immigration enforcement policy and TB. Every 
year, thousands of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico apply 
for asylum in the United States. These migrants are frequently apprehended along the 
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U.S. border with Mexico and detained for at least some period. The number of El 
Salvadorans applying for asylum has increased every year since 2010, swelling from 
2900 in fiscal year (FY) 2011 to 10,469 in FY2015. Guatemalan applications for asylum 
grew from 2454 in FY2011 to 6898 in FY2015, and Honduran asylum claims exploded 
from 1157 in FY2011 to 8332 in FY2015. Additionally, Mexican asylum claims grew 
from 7454 in FY2011 to 10,143 in FY2014 but then fell back to 8926 in FY2015. Despite 
these large numbers of asylum claims, only a fraction are receiving asylum. In FY2015, 
the EOIR granted asylum to only 303 El Salvadorans, 369 Guatemalans, 307 Hondurans, 
and 203 Mexicans.172 
China, Russia, and India, the other countries specifically analyzed in this thesis, 
are also sources of asylum applicants. The number of asylum applications from Chinese 
citizens has decreased each year since 2011, dropping from 10,481 applications in 2011 
to 1757 applications in 2015. Chinese citizens receive more grants of asylum in the 
United States than any other nationality. The number of Indian asylum applicants has 
remained relatively constant for the past five years. There were 1612 Indian asylum 
applications in 2011, and 1135 Indian asylum applications in 2015. The number of 
Russian asylum applicants has decreased every year since 2010, falling from 491 
applications in FY2011 to a mere 98 applications in FY2015.173 
F. EOIR STATISTICS 
One of the reasons for the extended timeframes of the removal process is that 
EOIR reviews an enormous caseload each year. As illustrated in Table 1, EOIR has 
received nearly 200,000 new cases each year since 2011. Table 2 demonstrates that EOIR 
only completes a portion of its new cases every year. This contributes to the length of the 
removal process. Table 3 shows that the majority of cases heard by EOIR have been for 
aliens not in ICE custody.174 The information from the tables is taken directly from the 
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EOIR FY2015 Statistics Yearbook.175 As is explained in subsequent chapters, the length 
of time available for treatment and the custody status of aliens are important factors when 
analyzing policy options for immigration enforcement and TB treatment.  
Table 1.   Immigration Court Cases Received by Case Type176 
Type of 
Case FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 
Removal  236,604 211,285 193,660 226,042 187,005 
Credible 
Fear  
885 739 1,770 6,498 6,629 
Reasonable 
Fear  
441 815 1,159 1,777 2,587 
Claimed 
Status  
26 37 31 22 21 
Asylum Only  403 356 395 294 255 




5 2 0 3 2 
NACARA  1 0 2 4 1 
Withholding 
Only  
884 1,091 2,334 3,168 2,988 
Total  239,298 214,350 199,398 237,839 199,534 
 
                                                 
175 Adapted from Office of Planning, Analysis, and Statistics, FY2015 Statistics Yearbook (Falls 
Church, VA: Executive Office for Immigration Review, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/statistical-
year-book, B1-B2.  
176 Ibid. 
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Table 2.   Immigration Court Initial Case Completions by Case Type177 
Type of 
Case FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 
Deportation  669 639 698 531 570 
Exclusion  61 54 54 36 57 
Removal  206,038 184,847 167,753 156,470 169,043 
Credible 
Fear  
893 707 1,727 6,351 6,630 
Reasonable 
Fear  
443 775 1,139 1,712 2,570 
Claimed 
Status  
28 35 32 23 19 
Asylum 
Only  
423 366 381 360 294 




3 2 2 2 3 
NACARA  8 2 3 1 2 
Withholding 
Only  
681 760 1,348 2,620 2,357 
Total  209,293 188,223 173,176 168,140 181,575 
 
 
                                                 
177 Ibid. 
45 
Table 3.   Immigration Court Initial Case Completions for Detained Aliens 
(Including IHP)178 








FY11  112,787 209,293 54% 
FY12  89,621 188,223 48% 
FY13  63,331 173,176 37% 
FY14  61,590 168,140 37% 
FY15  51,005 181,575 28% 
 
G. DETENTION DURING AND AFTER REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Of note, the DHS does not detain all aliens who are encountered and arrested by 
its immigration officers. An alien can be in removal proceedings whether in detention or 
not. There are many reasons that the DHS might release an alien. Examples of these 
reasons include serious humanitarian concerns, if the alien has serious health issues, or 
whether detention space is available at the time of the encounter. Serious humanitarian 
concerns can include situations such as the alien being the sole care provider for a child 
or disabled relative, or the alien being the witness to, or victim of, a crime. Aliens may 
also be released on bond or on a program titled “Alternatives to Detention” (see Chapter 
V). 
Different sections of law govern detention before the issuance of an order of 
removal (known as “pre-order detention”) and detention after issuance of an order of 
removal (known as “post-order detention”). Section 236 of the INA, “Apprehension and 
Detention of Aliens,” governs pre-order detention. Section 236 states in part, “On a 
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a 
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”179 Certain classes 
                                                 
178 The “IHP” referred to in the title of Table 3 is the Institutional Hearing Program. This program 
consists of EOIR adjudicating removal cases for aliens that are incarcerated in state and federal prisons so 
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179 The attorney general’s functions relating to immigration enforcement were transferred to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
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of aliens, including those convicted of aggravated felonies, suspected terrorists, aliens 
who are inadmissible on certain criminal grounds of exclusion, and for other reasons, are 
subject to mandatory detention. The DHS may detain aliens who are not subject to 
mandatory detention or release them under such conditions as the DHS secretary 
imposes. These conditions can include a bond of at least $1500, conditional parole, or 
release on ATD.180 To state this more plainly, the INA requires the DHS to detain some 
aliens, but it is up to the arresting agency whether or not to detain most arrested persons. 
There is no statutory limitation on the amount of time the DHS may detain an 
alien while removal proceedings are pending. Under INA § 236(a) aliens not subject to 
mandatory detention may ask an immigration judge to review the conditions of their 
custody (commonly referred to as a “bond hearing”). The alien must prove to the 
satisfaction of the immigration judge that the alien poses no danger to the community, 
danger to national security, or a flight risk. The immigration judge has broad leeway in 
determining which factors to consider in custody redetermination proceedings.181 The 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals held in the 2013 decision Rodriguez v Robbins that any alien, 
even one subject to mandatory detention, who is detained for more than 180 days must be 
given a bond hearing before an immigration judge.182 There is no comparable rule 
applicable in other federal appellate circuits. 
Section 241 of the INA, “Detention and Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed,” 
governs post-order detention. Section 241 instructs DHS to detain aliens who have been 
ordered removed and to remove them from the United States within 90 days. As with pre-
order detention, the law requires the detention of some aliens during this 90-day period. 
Categories of aliens whom the DHS must detain include aliens convicted of aggravated 
felonies and terrorists.183 The DHS may release aliens who are not subject to mandatory 
detention during the removal period under such conditions as the DHS secretary imposes. 
                                                 
180 INA § 236(a) (2). 
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Detention beyond the 90 day removal period is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (6) (1994 
ed., Supp. V), which allows continued detention for, in part:  
An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible… [2] [or] removable 
[as a result of violations of status requirements or entry conditions, 
violations of criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or [3] 
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the 
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be 
detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to 
[certain] terms of supervision…  
In plain language, most aliens do not have to be detained even after receiving an order of 
removal, and even those aliens who must be detained are eventually released if they 
cannot be deported within the legal timeframe. 
It is not always possible for the government to remove people within this 90-day 
window for a variety of reasons not germane to this policy options review. In the case of 
aliens who are subject to mandatory detention, this presented a significant legal question 
with potential Constitutional implications. The U.S. Supreme Court resolved this 
question in Zadvydas v. Davis.184 The Supreme Court held that there is a presumptively 
reasonable post-order detention period of 180 days. Detained aliens can challenge their 
detention through habeas corpus proceedings.185 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court stated 
about habeas proceedings:  
In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether the 
detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure 
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the 
statute’s basic purpose, namely assuring the alien’s presence at the 
moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the 
court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer 
authorized by statute.186  
A subsequent decision, Clark v. Martinez, extended the Zadvydas decision to 
inadmissible aliens.187 
                                                 
184 Zadvydas v Davis, 533 U.S. (2001), § IV.  
185 28 U. S. C., § 2241(c) (3).  
186 Zadvydas.  
187 Clark et al. v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-
878.ZS.html.  
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H. UNEXECUTED ORDERS OF REMOVAL 
The fact that an alien has been issued an order of removal does not mean that he 
or she will depart the United States. The INS estimated that there were 331,734 aliens 
with unexecuted final orders of removal, also known as immigration fugitives, in 
September 2001. By August 2006, this number had swelled to 623,292.188 ICE no longer 
publishes numbers on immigration fugitives. 
                                                 
188 Jacqueline Simms, Kristine Odina, and Michael Zeitler, An Assessment of the United States 
Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams (OIG-07-34) (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2007), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIG_07-34_Mar07.pdf, 12.  
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IV. THE STATUS QUO: CURRENT IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT LAW AND POLICY AS THEY RELATE TO 
TUBERCULOSIS 
A. CURRENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICIES 
This section reviews the current immigration enforcement policies of the DHS 
relating to the arrest, detention, and removal of undocumented migrants. Additionally, it 
analyzes the effects of specific aspects of these policies on TB. Finally, it identifies gaps 
in the DHS’s ability to identify and treat aliens with TB based on current policies.  
1. DHS Policy on Apprehension, Detention, and Removal 
The INA has been refined through the policies of the Department of Homeland 
Security. The current DHS policy is laid out in “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants” (hereafter “the 2014 DHS policy”), issued 
on November 20, 2014, by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson.189 This policy supersedes all 
previous DHS guidance on enforcement priorities. 
2. Encounter and Arrest Policies and Practices 
Immigration enforcement begins with the encounter and arrest of an alien by 
immigration officers. The 2014 DHS policy made the apprehension of aliens attempting 
to cross the border illegally and aliens convicted of felony offenses some of DHS’s top 
immigration enforcement priorities.190 The incidence of TB along the U.S. border with 
Mexico is higher than the general rate for either country, and incarcerated populations are 
at an enhanced risk for TB infection.191 Thus, while the 2014 DHS policy does not 
directly address infectious diseases, an unintended consequence of the policy is that the 
DHS enforcement priorities include categories of aliens known to be at increased risk for 
TB. 
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The initial encounter is also the first chance for the DHS to identify that an alien 
has TB. The arrested alien may report symptoms of active TB disease such as a bad 
cough, chest pain, coughing up blood, weakness or fatigue, chills, and fever.192 Note that 
officers are not trained medical professionals and receive no formal training on 
identifying TB. After the arrest, the alien is then processed so that she or he may be 
placed in removal proceedings. Processing provides another chance for the arresting 
officer to again observe the alien for any obvious symptoms of illness, as well an 
opportunity to ask the alien if he or she has any medical issues. During processing, the 
alien’s biographical information and all factors pertinent to the initiation of removal 
proceedings are recorded on form I-213 “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien.” Of 
note, the form does not contain a field for medical history. 
After the DHS processes an alien is for removal proceedings, ICE must decide 
whether or not to detain that person. Both CBP and ICE arrest aliens, but CBP does not 
detain aliens beyond the time spent at the processing station. If CBP decides to detain an 
alien, then that alien is then turned over to ICE for further action. Once ICE takes custody 
of an alien, policy requires that person to be given a risk classification assessment (RCA) 
as early in the process as possible unless the alien is subject to mandatory detention or is 
going to be removed within five days.193 The RCA was developed to assist with creating 
uniformity in custody and release decisions.194  
The RCA contains questions on personal details, encounter details, supporting 
information, special vulnerabilities, mandatory detention, the risk to public safety, and 
the risk of flight.195 The RCA does not include communicable diseases under “risk to 
public safety.” Public safety considerations consist of an alien’s criminal history, history 
of violence, and any disciplinary history while previously incarcerated. Based on these 
                                                 
192 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Tuberculosis (TB) Disease: Symptoms & Risk 
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193 Marcia Moxey Hodges et al., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Alternatives to 
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factors, the RCA system provides a recommendation for detention or release and a 
potential bond amount if applicable. The RCA places serious illnesses under “special 
vulnerabilities” category. The instructions for the RCA under “Serious Physical Illness” 
state, “Assess whether the individual has been diagnosed or claims to have a serious 
physical illness such as diabetes, seizures, HIV, AIDS, heart problems, cancer, epilepsy, 
or other serious illness.”196 However, there is no direct mention of TB in the RCA. 
Special vulnerabilities might best be thought of as reasons to not detain an alien, 
counterweighted by risk factors such as criminal convictions or a history of escape 
attempts. If the RCA calculation recommends detention but the alien has a serious 
medical condition, then she or he is referred to a supervisor for a decision on whether to 
detain or release that person and under what release conditions.197 
3. Detention Policies and Practices 
This section reviews the current policies relating to the detention of 
undocumented migrants. It also reviews the healthcare provisions of the 2011 PBNDS 
relating to TB. Additionally, it identifies that not all detained aliens are managed using 
the same detention standards, nor do all detained aliens receive identical care for TB.  
a. Healthcare Provisions of the ICE Detention Standards 
The detention provisions of the INA make no mention of public health or 
communicable disease. The INA does contain health-related grounds for excluding 
someone from entry into the United States and for the detention of alien crew for medical 
examination, but for purposes of this thesis restricts consideration to aliens who are 
already present in the United States or who are apprehended while attempting to enter the 
United States illegally. 
ICE is responsible for providing medical care to all aliens in its custody. Different 
standards of care apply if the alien is detained for more than 72 hours or less than 72 
hours. The Immigration Health Services Corps (IHSC), a division of ICE, follows the 
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2011 PBNDS at those facilities other than family residential centers where it directly 
provides medical coverage. However, three other sets of standards are in effect at 
different detention facilities around the country: the 2000 National Detention Standards, 
the 2008 Performance Based Detention Standards, and the Family Residential 
Standards.198 This multiplicity of care standards greatly complicates ICE’s response to 
communicable diseases. ICE does not have publicly available standards for under 72-
hour detention. 
The 2011 PBNDS are the most current detention standards. They are the guiding 
standard for around 60 percent of ICE detainees.199 Also, they are the standards used at 
facilities where the IHSC provides medical services, and ICE is actively working to 
convert facilities that are on older detention standards to the 2011 PBNDS. For these 
reasons, the 2011 PBNDS will be used for all further discussions of ICE’s detention and 
healthcare policies. Any exceptions will specifically state the detention standard 
referenced. 
b. The 2011 Performance Based Detention Standards and Tuberculosis  
The 2011 PBNDS requires that an alien receive a TB screening following CDC 
guidelines within 12 hours of arriving at the detention facility. This screening may be 
given by a medical professional or a specially trained detention officer. The detainee may 
not be placed in a housing unit until this screening is completed. Detention facilities are 
not required to screen detainees who were in the continuous custody of a law 
enforcement agency and who have a documented TB screening within the past six 
months. Annual or periodic TB tests are required for any alien in detention for more than 
one year. Detention facilities are also required to have a healthcare practitioner conduct a 
comprehensive health examination within 14 days of arrival. This comprehensive 
assessment includes both physical and mental health screenings. However, detention 
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facilities are not required to provide assessments to any detainee who has had a 
documented comprehensive health assessment within the last 90 days. 
The 2011 PBNDS requires:  
Detainees with symptoms suggestive of TB, or with suspected or 
confirmed active TB disease based on clinical and/or laboratory findings, 
shall be placed in a functional airborne infection isolation room with 
negative pressure ventilation and be promptly evaluated for TB disease. 
Patients with suspected active TB shall remain in airborne infection 
isolation until determined by a qualified provider to be noncontagious in 
accordance with CDC guidelines.200 
The 2011 PBNDS includes numerous procedural safeguards for managing 
confirmed and suspected cases of active TB. The detention facility must “Report all cases 
to local and/or state health departments within one working day of meeting reporting 
criteria and in accordance with established guidelines and applicable laws…”201 The 
facility must also notify the IHSC PHSP and provide biographical information, a case 
summary report, and a treatment status and start date. This notification was not required 
by the 2000 National Detention Standards and thus is not required at some ICE detention 
facilities.202 The detention facility must notify the IHSC PHSP of any hospitalizations, 
facility transfers, releases, or removals. This is to help coordinate continuity of care if 
ICE releases the alien before removal and to enlist local health department assistance in 
arranging continuity of care if the alien is released or removed to another country. 
Multidrug-resistant and extensively drug-resistant TB cases must be coordinated with the 
state or local health department to create a customized treatment regimen. Aliens are 
educated about their TB treatment and provided with a 15-day supply of medications 
when transferred, released, or removed.203 
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c. Medical Staff at ICE Detention Facilities 
Not all detention facilities used by ICE follow the same healthcare model, and 
ICE uses several types of detention facilities.204 The first type is a service processing 
center or SPC. An SPC is owned by ICE and can be staffed with either ICE officers or 
contract personnel. The next type is a contract detention facility or CDF. A CDF is 
owned and operated by a contractor but operating exclusively on an ICE contract. The 
majority of facilities are known as inter-government service agreement (IGSA) facilities. 
These facilities can be owned by state governments, county or local governments, or 
contractors, and generally do not solely house ICE detainees. An IGSA that solely houses 
ICE detainees is known as a dedicated IGSA. Some IGSA facilities are used exclusively 
for detaining people for less than 72 hours. These distinctions are important because the 
medical care provisions of the 2011 PBNDS apply in general only to facilities used for 
over 72-hour detention, only at facilities bound by the 2011 PBNDS, and certain 
procedures in those provisions do not apply to non-dedicated IGSA facilities.205 Non-
dedicated IGSA facilities must use comparable procedures to those listed in the ICE 
standard. 
The IHSC oversees the healthcare of ICE detainees. The IHSC is composed of 
“more than 900 U.S. Public Health Service commissioned officers, federal civil servants, 
and contract support staff.”206 However, IHSC only directly oversees medical care at 
21ICE detention and staging facilities.207 Medical care at the other facilities is provided 
by the government or private entity that operates the facility. Facilities without IHSC 
coverage face challenges such as rapid turnover and remote locations.208 
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4. Removal Policies and Practices 
When the DHS removes from the United States a detained alien who has TB, the 
detention facility should coordinate with the IHSC PHSP on an international referral and 
continuity of therapy. In 2004, ICE implemented a policy allowing for a temporary 
“medical hold” so that the IHSC could arrange for continuity of care before removal.209 
In 2005, ICE formalized policies for referring medical cases to two organizations: TBNet 
and CureTB.210 
TBNet, created by the Migrant Clinicians Network in 1996, provides continuity of 
care through case management of highly mobile TB patients, such as deportees.211 
According to TBNet, most alien patients only receive eight weeks of therapy before 
departing the United States. Such deportees usually make at least three major moves: 
from the population to a detention center, from the detention center to their country of 
origin, and/or from their place of arrival to their home in their country of origin. TBNet 
uses a caseworker to keep in telephone contact with the deported patients and with their 
healthcare provider to ensure that the patient is continuing treatment. 
CureTB is “a referral and continuity of care program for tuberculosis patients and 
their contacts who travel between the United States, Mexico, and Central America.”212 
CureTB functions as an information exchange and facilitation service. It educates 
deportees and connects them with TB clinics in their destination country and provides 
clinical information to the receiving clinics. CureTB also provides follow-up case 
information to the referring entity every two months and a final report after 12 months.213 
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There are notable differences between TBNet and CureTB. TBNet requires 
patient consent as a prerequisite for enrollment in the program. CureTB does not require 
consent because it is a program within a government public health entity. TBNet has 
more frequent contact with deported TB patients, while CureTB is more involved in 
active case management such as reviewing treatment plans and DOT records.214 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERSECTION OF CURRENT IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND TB 
This section analyzes the effects of current immigration enforcement policies on 
the DHS’s ability to identify and treat aliens with TB. Also, it reviews the potential risk 
that TB poses to DHS immigration officers and discusses the inability of DHS officers to 
identify the presence of TB. It then discusses challenges with treating TB under the 
current detention standards. Finally, it reviews how the removal process complicates the 
treatment of TB.  
1. The Intersection of Immigration Apprehension Policies and TB 
Just as apprehension provides the first chance for DHS officers to identify the 
presence of TB, it also presents the first chance for the transmission of infectious TB. 
Such transmission could occur during a field interview, in the transporting vehicle, or at 
the office where processing occurs. There is no safe exposure time to someone who has 
infectious TB; any length of contact carries at least a small risk of transmitting the 
disease.215 It is very difficult to quantify a person’s chance of contracting TB from 
contact with an infected person. Studies have identified several risk factors for catching 
TB such as the virulence of the infection in the person with TB, duration of contact, 
proximity of contact, the amount of air circulation available during contact, and 
underlying medical conditions in the potential recipient.216 The DHS does not keep 
statistics on employees infected with TB or any other disease, and so it is not possible to 
further quantify this risk. 
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Before a person receives treatment for TB, the disease must first be identified. 
There are many gaps in the DHS’s ability to identify the presence of TB disease at the 
time an alien is encountered or arrested. If the DHS releases an arrested alien, then the 
only medical information taken from most aliens is through an interview with an ICE 
officer and the creation of an I-213 and an RCA. In the cases of aliens received directly 
from penal institutions, medical records are sometimes available for review. ICE’s RCA 
does include questions on serious physical illnesses, but the form does not directly 
reference TB. Medical issues are a reason to release an alien from custody rather than to 
detain someone. Aliens may have TB and not be aware of it or may not disclose prior 
treatment to officers even when questioned. Furthermore, immigration officers are not 
medical personnel and are not trained to recognize the symptoms of TB. Even if an 
officer did observe signs of illness, or if the arrested alien gave a complete and accurate 
review of any symptoms of illness, the untrained officer could well miss the signs of TB. 
Many TB symptoms such as coughing, fever, chills, and fatigue are very similar to the flu 
or other illnesses.  
ICE procedures do not require an RCA for aliens who are subject to mandatory 
detention or are removable within five days. ICE uses non-judicial removal authorities, 
such as reinstated removal and administrative removal, to remove many aliens transferred 
to ICE custody after release from jail, or prison.217 These aliens are also frequently 
subject to mandatory detention, which again means that no RCA is required. Aliens 
apprehended at the border are frequently subject to the use of expedited removal or 
another legal authority that allows for their rapid deportation.218 When that alien is from 
Mexico, this means that removal is likely to take less than the five-day window. Thus, 
prisoners and Mexican nationals, both populations are known to be at enhanced risk for 
TB infection, are also some of the most likely to be rapidly removed without DHS 
performing even a cursory evaluation of that risk through completion of an RCA. If an 
alien does not receive an RCA, then form I-213 is the only place to note any medical 
issues, and the form does not contain a narrative field specifically for medical issues. 
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2. The Intersection of Immigration Detention and TB 
The primary way that ICE identifies the presence of TB is through the health 
screening performed when an alien is placed in detention for more than 72 hours. 
However, ICE detains only a fraction of the total number of aliens arrested by the DHS, 
and thus it is impossible to know how many aliens with either latent or active TB are 
encountered by the DHS each year.  
In FY2013, ICE detained an average of 32,805 people per day, and aliens spent an 
average of 27 days in ICE custody.219 During that same period, ICE removed 368,644 
people. Of these, 235,093 were arrested at or near the border while attempting to enter the 
United States from Mexico.220 Furthermore, there were 241,493 Mexican citizens 
removed. Most of the removals used non-judicial removal authorities. Expedited 
removals accounted for 101,000 people, 159,624 were subject to reinstated removal, and 
23,455 were allowed to depart voluntarily before the initiation of removal proceedings. 
Only around 75,000 were issued a final order of removal by an immigration judge.221 In 
summation, the overwhelming majority of removals were for Mexican citizens arrested at 
the border and issued a non-judicial order of removal. This means that the majority of 
aliens arrested and removed were not in ICE detention for more than 72 hours, and thus 
the DHS did not test them for TB. 
A study by the American Thoracic Association noted, “Persons who have 
immigrated from areas of the world with high rates of TB have incidence rates that 
approach those of their countries of origin for the first several years after arrival in the 
United States.”222 The DHS has not published a statistic for how many cases of TB were 
reported in ICE custody during FY2013, but for discussion purposes, a model can be built 
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using the assumption that the TB rate for immigrants was the same as the reported rate in 
their country of origin. As previously noted, in FY2013 ICE removed 368,644 people. 
That total included 241,493 Mexicans, 47,769 Guatemalans, 37,049 Hondurans, and 
21,602 El Salvadorans.223 According to the World Health Organization, the incidence of 
TB in Mexico was 21 cases per 100,000 people, in Guatemala it was 57 cases per 
100,000 people, in Honduras it was 43 cases per 100,000 people, and in El Salvador it 
was 41 cases per 100,000 people.224 If the incidence of TB in aliens removed by the DHS 
matched the incidence of their home countries, then in FY2013 the DHS removed 
approximately 103 people with TB from just those four countries. This equates to 29.6 
cases per 100,000 people removed. 
By way of comparison, both removal data and reported TB data are available for 
FY2004 and FY2005. ICE has changed the methodology used to report removal data 
several times making a comparative analysis with 2013 removal numbers impossible, but 
these numbers at least serve to help frame the issue.225 In FY2004, ICE removed 202,842 
aliens, and in FY2005, ICE removed 208,521 aliens. In FY2004, the reported incidence 
of TB for aliens in ICE custody was 82.6 per 100,000, and in FY2005, it was 121.5 per 
100,000.226 For an analysis of the incidence of TB in ICE custody see Chapter VII. 
These numbers, although not an exact comparison, help to illustrate the potential 
magnitude of the problem of TB in immigration enforcement. In FY2004, ICE removed 
only about half as many aliens as in FY2013. Despite this drastic disparity in the number 
of removals, the reported incidence of TB for aliens in ICE custody, a fraction of the total 
of aliens encountered by the DHS, was nearly three times the 2013 estimate using the 
model built with current World Health Organization figures for all aliens removed by 
ICE. The reported incidence of TB in FY2005 is more than four times the FY2013 
estimate, while the removal numbers are again just over half of the FY2013 removals. 
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Because ICE only tests aliens for TB if they are in detention for more than 72 hours, it is 
impossible to say with any accuracy how many aliens with TB the DHS encountered. 
However, at least in 2004 and 2005, the known incidence of TB in ICE custody far 
exceeded the number generated from the 2013 theoretical model using a much larger 
population. 
The ICE detention standards may contribute to the creation of drug-resistant TB 
because they do not require the complete treatment of TB before removal. As previously 
noted in Part 1C of this chapter, the ICE policy requires that aliens with TB are treated 
until they are no longer contagious. It is important to note that noncontagious is not 
synonymous with cured. The 27 days that the average alien spends in detention is not 
sufficient time to cure TB. Improper or incomplete treatment of TB disease can result in a 
return to a contagious state, acquired drug resistance, transmission of the disease to 
others, and poor outcomes including death.227  
3. The Intersection of Removal Policies and TB 
Removal from the United States presents many challenges to TB treatment. In 
2001 the CDC noted, “One of the most challenging tasks in managing TB among 
detainees is the coordination of care during the post-detention period in the United States 
or in the patients’ countries of origin.”228 In November 2002, the Advisory Council for 
the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) recommended that a working group be formed 
to review problems with post-detention TB treatment of aliens released or removed by 
the INS.229 ACET suggested that removal should only occur after the “responsible state 
TB controller” approved a treatment plan, including verifying that necessary treatment is 
available at the destination. ACET also suggested referring cases to international TB 
referral programs such as TBNet and CureTB. 
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The CDC recommends directly observed therapy (DOT) for all TB treatment.230 
DOT is a protocol where a healthcare provider watches the patient take each dose of 
medication to ensure that the patient fully and correctly completes the course of 
treatment. If a detainee with TB is released from custody but remains in the community, 
then they are referred to local health officials for continuity of care, including DOT. 
Aliens deported by the DHS are in a completely different situation. ICE policy 
requires that the alien is given a 15-day supply of medication, but this is a small fraction 
of the necessary three to nine-month course of treatment.231 As previously noted, ICE 
refers deported TB patients to TBNet and CureTB. Of note, ICE has no authority to 
enforce this referral either on the part of the aliens or the part of the foreign government 
or health department receiving the deportee. Once in their country of origin, aliens may 
travel to or reside in a location where they have limited access to healthcare or have 
limited funding to buy medication and pay for treatment. Aliens may also cease treatment 
if they do not feel sick; the medical community created DOT to address this exact issue. 
There is even a chance that, due to different protocols on TB testing and treatment, 
someone diagnosed with TB in the United States would not be recognized in their home 
country as having the disease. The presence of drug-resistant TB or factors such as co-
morbidity with other conditions, such as HIV/AIDS, can add additional complications. 
In a 2011 report, TBNet claimed an 85 percent rate of successful completion of 
treatment for all cases referred to TBNet between May 1, 2005, and February 28, 2008.232 
Five percent refused to continue treatment, and 10 percent were lost to follow-up. 
Referred deportees with multi-drug resistant TB had a 50 percent treatment success rate. 
One limitation of the TBNet study is that due to the different detention standards in 
effect, ICE detention facilities refer “most but not all” TB cases of deportee before 
removal. ICE referred Mexican citizens deported from states other than Texas, and New 
Mexico to CureTB instead of TBNet.  
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Results cited by CureTB are different than the figures reported by TBNet. In 
2009, a report by CureTB stated, “Our results are consistent with early assessments of 
outcomes among TB patients in ICE custody. We found that 80% of all TB patients were 
enrolled in an international TB referral program, with 58% completing treatment and 
23% either lost to follow-up or with no reported outcome.”233 
On March 1, 2008, Commander Diana Schneider of the ICE Immigration Health 
Services Corps gave a presentation to the International Union Against TB and Lung 
Disease.234 During that presentation, Commander Schneider reported the key outcomes of 
TB referrals for the period of January 2004 to July 2006. ICE reported 416 active TB 
patients during this period. Of these, 356 people, nearly 86 percent, were enrolled in a TB 
referral program. Of those so enrolled, 208 (about 58 percent) completed treatment. ICE 
deported 284 active TB patients, and 148 of those (about 52 percent) completed 
treatment. ICE released 45 active TB patients inside the United States; 27 of those (60 
percent) completed treatment. In all, 112 people (about 28 percent) did not complete 
treatment. Of those, 71 were “lost to follow-up,” and 30 either refused treatment totally 
or else ceased treatment at some point. Moreover, 50 people (12 percent) had no known 
treatment outcome. Finally, 22 people (around 5 percent) were reclassified as not having 
TB or were not recommended for treatment. 
As can be seen from the numbers reported above TBNet, CureTB, and ICE report 
different results from TB referrals. There are not enough data available to account for the 
disparity in reported results. It is possible that it stems from the differences in populations 
involved in the reports. For instance, CureTB dealt solely with Mexicans, while TBNet 
mostly dealt with aliens from countries other than Mexico, and ICE is reporting an 
amalgam of all nationalities. Both CureTB and TBNet now refer cases to any country.235 
CureTB does not require patient consent for enrollment in the program, but TBNet 
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does.236 It is also possible that TBNet’s case management model achieves better 
outcomes because it uses case managers to interact with both deported TB patients and 
healthcare workers; perhaps this additional interpersonal communication encourages 
better participation. The difference in case management models between CureTB and 
TBNet are also possible causes of the disparity in results. 
This thesis uses the number reported by ICE as the baseline. To reiterate, 
according to ICE, around 40 percent of aliens with active TB failed to complete treatment 
either in their home country or the United States. DHS statistics also show that removal 
from the United States, particularly for those aliens illegally crossing the U.S. border with 
Mexico, does not mean that the alien will never again be a member of an American 
community. For example, in FY2014 CBP’s Office of Border Patrol removed 205,058 
persons. Of those, 54,115, slightly more than one-quarter of every alien arrested, had 
been previously removed from the United States.237 This statistic on deportee recidivism 
is consistent with a 2003 CDC report on post-detention completion rates for TB treatment 
in which the authors stated, “During January 2000–March 2001, CURE-TB reported that 
25 percent of TB patients deported to Latin America with known follow-up returned to 
the United States (K. Moser, San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, personal 
communication, 2001).”238 The United States maintains a clear public health interest in 
aliens with TB present in the country, regardless of the person’s legal status until that TB 
is cured. 
C. SUMMARY 
The status quo is that current immigration enforcement policies concentrate TB 
control efforts on the detained population. Testing is performed only on aliens detained 
for more than 72 hours. Aliens must be treated for TB disease until they are no longer 
contagious before they can be deported. ICE uses two international referral services to 
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help provide continuity of care after removal. The existence of multiple detention 
standards and the fact the ICE IHSC provides medical care at only a select group of 
facilities complicates TB treatment and case management. 
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V. POLICY OPTION: CURE TUBERCULOSIS BEFORE 
REMOVAL 
A. POLICY DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON TO THE STATUS QUO  
As noted in Chapter IV, there are many issues with ensuring that deported TB 
patients complete their treatment after removal. This is problematic because improper or 
incomplete treatment of TB disease can result in a return to a contagious state, acquired 
drug resistance, transmission of the disease to others, and poor outcomes, including 
death.239 One way to potentially obtain better treatment outcomes for aliens undergoing 
TB treatment is for them to complete TB treatment in the United Sates before removal. 
According to the CDC, “Treatment of patients with tuberculosis is most successful within 
a comprehensive framework that addresses both clinical and social issues of relevance to 
the patient.”240 Aliens’ removal from the United States to their country of origin is one 
such social issue of relevance and must be taken into account when creating a treatment 
plan. Under this policy option, there would be no consideration of removal from the 
United States before the successful completion of treatment for aliens with either latent or 
active TB. 
1. Proposed Changes to the Status Quo Apprehension Policy 
There would be no changes to the overall DHS immigration enforcement strategy 
under this policy option. For example, ICE would not target aliens with diseases of public 
health significance for arrest and removal. However, before TB can be treated, the 
arresting agency must be aware that it exists. This would require a change to the way 
DHS processes aliens for removal proceedings or additional TB testing. Chapter VII 
analyzes the policy option to increase TB testing.  
As established in Chapter IV, the initial encounter with an immigration 
enforcement officer provides the DHS’s first chance to identify the presence of TB. This 
is primarily done through an in-person interview and the creation of two forms: the form 
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I-213 (record of deportable alien), and the risk classification assessment (RCA). The form 
I-213 does not have a dedicated space for medical information. Although the RCA does 
contain information about health issues, it does not ask about TB. It would be a relatively 
simple matter to update the forms to include TB screening questions, but this would not 
change the fact that immigration officers are not trained healthcare providers and could 
miss the presence of TB even if they note the presence of symptoms. 
In 2006, the CDC recommended that short-term detention facilities should 
perform a TB symptom screening on all new intakes.241 While the report does not 
directly refer to immigration processing centers, the principles in the report would still 
apply. The question then becomes who would perform such a screening. The obvious 
answer is that medical professionals would administer the screening, but this would be 
extremely expensive. There are around 135 Border Patrol stations in the United States.242 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median wage for a licensed practical 
nurse in 2015 was $44,030 per year.243 Even if one nurse were sufficient for each Border 
Patrol station, this would cost the DHS $5,944,050 per year, and this figure does not yet 
include any of the dozens of ICE offices in the United States. 
The existing ICE detention standards point towards a potential solution to this 
problem. The ICE detention standard on medical care requires that new detainees receive 
an initial healthcare screening within 12 hours of arrival at the facility. This screening can 
be performed by “a healthcare provider or a specially trained detention officer.”244 DHS 
could extend this policy to cover processing centers and train immigration officers to 
perform initial health screenings for all arrested aliens. While immigration officers might 
earn more in wages than do licensed practical nurses, it might be possible to perform 
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healthcare screenings using existing staff and thus not increase costs. If such a specially 
trained officer believed that an alien exhibited symptoms of TB, or described a medical 
history consistent with TB, then that alien could be referred for further testing. Such 
testing could occur whether or not the DHS detained that person, but the suspected 
presence of a disease of public health significance would be a factor in determining to 
detain the person due to the risk the disease poses to the community. However, such 
screenings would only detect a fraction of the TB disease present in the population 
encountered by immigration officers. Many people with TB disease are asymptomatic.245 
As discussed in Chapter III, the DHS does not detain the majority of aliens 
arrested by its officers even if those aliens are in removal proceedings. Encountered 
aliens may fall outside of DHS’s enforcement priorities, be the sole care provider for a 
child or disabled relative, or have some other factor, which makes their detention be not 
in the best interests of the government. The DHS may set whatever conditions it sees fit 
for release from custody. If the initial health screening proposed in this policy option 
showed that an alien might have TB, then one of those release conditions could be that 
the released person be tested for TB, and if found to have TB, then to undergo treatment 
for the disease. 
2. Proposed Changes to the Status Quo Detention Policies 
This section outlines several possible options for modifying detention practices to 
more directly address challenges related to TB. It reviews court cases related to 
immigration detention and the potential legality of using immigration detention authority 
to treat people for diseases, such as TB. It then reviews other disease-related detention 
authorities. Finally, it analyzes the possible use of the ICE program “Alternatives to 
Detention” to help manage treatment of aliens with TB in a non-detained setting.  
a. Detention to Continue Medical Care 
Curing TB before removal would not entail changes to the healthcare provisions 
of the ICE detention standards, but there would potentially be changes to the application 
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of the DHS’s detention authorities. As discussed in Chapter IV, at the time of arrest ICE 
uses the RCA to determine if an alien should be detained or released and if released what 
the conditions of release should be. The RCA takes into account if the alien is a flight 
risk, is a danger to the community, or has a special vulnerability. The term danger (or 
risk) to the community also frequently appears in court decisions concerning immigration 
detention, such as Zadvydas.246 The danger to the community is always discussed in 
terms of criminal convictions and history of violence; however, there is nothing in the 
statute that precludes consideration of a communicable disease as a danger to the 
community. The Immigration Amendments Act of 1990 excludes any alien “who is 
determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services) to have a communicable disease of public health significance.”247 To 
paraphrase this ground of exclusion: aliens who have communicable diseases of public 
health significance present a danger to the community. Infectious TB is one such 
disease.248 
As discussed in Chapter III, aliens not subject to mandatory detention may ask an 
Immigration Judge to review the conditions of their custody (commonly referred to as a 
“bond hearing”). The Immigration Judge has broad leeway to determine what factors to 
consider during a bond hearing.249 ICE could argue that diseases of public health 
significance such as infectious TB pose a danger to the community and constitute a basis 
for continued detention. While it is not possible to pre-suppose whether this argument 
would prevail in a bond hearing, the immigration judges can consider the matter due to 
their leeway in bond hearings. Such an argument would not be effective in the case of an 
alien with latent TB as that person poses no imminent danger to the community. 
Detention following the issuance of a final order of removal presents separate 
issues. To reiterate the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas:  
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In answering that basic question, the habeas court must ask whether the 
detention in question exceeds a period reasonably necessary to secure 
removal. It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the 
statute’s basic purpose, namely assuring the alien’s presence at the 
moment of removal. Thus, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the 
court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer 
authorized by statute.250  
Zadvydas again refers to danger to the community as a reason to detain an alien, and it 
makes no reference to communicable diseases or other health issues. 
Despite the potential legal obstacles, we should not overlook the fact that 
immigration detention provides a unique opportunity to treat aliens for TB. In criminal 
detention, the convicted person must be released promptly at the expiration of their 
sentence regardless of any existing health issues. By way of contrast, aliens in civil 
detention for removal proceedings may be held in detention for the duration of their 
removal proceedings, regardless of the length of those proceedings, and a presumptively 
reasonable period of 180 days after receiving a final removal order. These timeframes are 
sufficient to complete a full course of treatment (depending on the specific treatment 
regimen) for latent TB infection or uncomplicated active TB disease. Of note, Zadvydas 
does not require the release of an alien after 180 days; it only establishes that 180 days is 
presumptively reasonable. Post 180-day detention must be justified as to its 
reasonableness. ICE headquarters reviews detention beyond 180 days, and danger to the 
community is the primary factor considered in continued detention. A communicable 
disease of public health significance arguably poses the necessary danger to the 
community to justify continued detention. 
Additional legal issues must be considered when contemplating the use of civil 
immigration detention specifically for medical care. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Zadvydas states that the reasonableness of the length of detention relates directly to the 
government’s ability to remove an alien from the United States. Thus, it could be argued 
that under Zadvydas, the continued detention of an otherwise removable alien for the 
purpose of medical treatment is not permissible. The court system has not tested this 
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proposition. It is also possible that the courts would only find detention during the period 
of infectiousness to be reasonable. Not all forms of TB are on the list of diseases of 
public health significance, only infectious TB. A possible solution for the legal hurdles 
created by new uses of detention authority is offered below in the section titled “A 
Potential Solution—Alternatives to Detention.” 
b. Quarantine and Isolation—Other Health-Related Detention Authorities 
If the courts, whether immigration or United States, held that civil immigration 
detention could not be used specifically to ensure medical treatment of aliens during or 
after removal proceedings, it would then be necessary to rely on other public health 
detention authorities to continue treatment in a custodial setting. This would also be true 
in the case of an alien with TB, who was detained during removal proceedings but was 
granted some form of relief from removal, had their proceedings terminated or was 
otherwise no longer subject to the DHS’s civil immigration detention authorities. 
In Through the Quarantine Looking Glass: Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis and 
Public Health Governance, Law, and Ethics, the authors stated:  
Public health authorities possess a variety of powers to restrict the 
autonomy or liberty of persons who pose a public health threat because 
they are infected with, or have been exposed to, dangerous, contagious 
pathogens. These authorities can direct individuals to discontinue risk 
behaviors (e.g., ‘cease and desist’ orders), compel them to submit to 
physical examination or treatment, and detain them using public health or 
criminal justice powers. Legal authority to exercise these powers in the 
United States can be found at local, state, and federal levels.251  
This policy options analysis considers only federal authorities. 
The secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has the authority to 
quarantine or isolate under the Public Health Service Act.252 This includes the authority 
to apprehend and detain individuals infected with quarantinable diseases. Quarantinable 
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diseases are established by executive order, and infectious TB is one of these diseases.253 
Furthermore, there are both civil and criminal penalties for violating quarantine laws.254 
In practice, federal isolation and quarantine authorities are rarely used in modern times. 
In 2007, the CDC issued an isolation order against a U.S. citizen diagnosed with 
extensively drug-resistant TB; it was the first federal isolation order issued since 1963.255 
c. A Potential Solution—Alternatives to Detention 
ICE has already provided a potential solution to both the potential legal issues 
raised by changing the use of immigration detention authority to help treat TB and to the 
high cost of traditional detention. The solution, a program appropriately named 
Alternatives to Detention (ATD), is “a flight-risk mitigation tool that uses technology and 
case management to increase an alien’s compliance with release conditions, and to 
facilitate alien compliance with court hearings and final orders of removal while allowing 
aliens to remain in their community...”256 ATD uses tools such as random telephone 
check-ins verified through voice recognition technology, Global Positioning System 
(GPS) ankle bracelets, and both scheduled and unscheduled home and office visits to 
encourage an alien’s compliance with the conditions of her or his release.  
ATD is significantly cheaper that traditional detention. ICE estimates that it costs 
an average of $119 per day to detain an alien.257 In contrast, the cost of ATD ranges from 
$0.17 per day to $17.78 per day per participant, depending on the technology used and 
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the contracted services applied to the alien.258 In 2012, the average cost per participant in 
ATD was $5.94. 
Aliens released on ATD can be supervised directly by ICE officers or enrolled in 
programs operated by contractors. One such ATD program is the Intensive Supervision 
Appearance Program (ISAP).259 The ISAP contract does not currently provide for the 
contractor to ensure compliance with medical treatment, but it does include a component 
for referrals for medical services.260 The 2011 PBNDS requires the IHSC PHSP to 
coordinate with state and local health departments for continuity of care when ICE 
releases an alien infected with TB into the community. This process would also apply to 
aliens released from detention facilities on ATD but not aliens released directly from 
arrest and processing sites. The state or local health department with jurisdiction over the 
alien’s place of residence would bear the responsibility for the cost of treatment and case 
management. 
3. Proposed Changes to the Status Quo Removal Policy 
The only change to ICE’s removal policies under this policy option would be the 
fundamental change that ICE would not remove aliens until cured of TB disease. 
B. ANALYSIS OF CURING TB BEFORE REMOVAL 
This section analyzes some of the challenges to curing TB before removing an 
alien from the United States. These challenges include the cost of detention, the 
limitation of the Alternatives to Detention program, and the inability of ICE to pay for the 
medical care of anyone not detained by ICE.  
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1. The Cost of Detention 
If the DHS detains aliens for the additional time necessary to complete TB 
treatment, then it will add to the already high cost of immigration detention. The cost of 
detention remains a sizable hurdle even if policy overcomes the significant legal issues 
related to detaining individuals for medical treatment. ICE estimates that aliens with 
criminal convictions (ICE’s current enforcement priority) remain in ICE custody for an 
average of 34.5 days.261 Using this figure and the previously cited rate of $119 per day 
for detention, ICE spends an average of $4105.50 to detain the average criminal alien for 
removal. To detain the same alien for 270 days (the maximum length of time necessary to 
complete therapy for latent or active TB disease as noted in Chapter II) would cost 
$32,130. Note that the cost of detention would only be higher for aliens who would 
otherwise have been released from custody. There would be no additional detention cost 
for those aliens who would already be in custody during their removal proceedings. 
2. Issues with Alternatives to Detention 
ATD may relieve the burdens of detention, but it is not a panacea for medical 
treatment. Once ICE releases an alien from detention, there are potential obstacles to 
treatment even if they remain in the United States. For example, the alien may reside in 
an area where medical care is sparse or underfunded. This is particularly true along the 
U.S. border with Mexico. According to the CDC, “Low socioeconomic status, crowded 
living conditions, and limited access to healthcare increase the risk for TB transmission 
on both sides of the border.”262 The same report also noted, “A total of 10 of 24 counties 
evaluated along the U.S.-Mexico border are medically underserved and of low 
socioeconomic status.”263 
It is also true that ICE uses the Alternatives to Detention Program as a condition 
of release for a reason. If that reason has not changed then even if an alien does not 
comply with medical treatment requirements, it might not be feasible to take that alien 
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into custody to enforce compliance. For example, if someone was released on 
Alternatives to Detention because he or she was the sole care provider for a child, then it 
is unlikely that he or she would be taken into custody unless there had been a substantial 
change in conditions, such as having been convicted of a felony. 
3. Limitations on ICE Funded Medical Care 
It is one thing for the DHS to require that an alien seeks medical treatment; it is 
another thing entirely for that alien to get such treatment. While treatment for latent TB 
infection is not exorbitantly expensive, it does have a cost. Healthcare costs in the United 
States are highly variable, but as an example in March 2016, the California Department 
of Health estimated that treatment for latent TB infection would cost $147 per month or 
$441 for a three-month course of treatment.264 Treatment for active TB disease is much 
more expensive; in a 2014 report, the CDC estimated that TB treatment cost $17,000 per 
patient.265 
The question inevitably arises as to who will pay for this treatment. ICE’s 
healthcare appropriations only apply to aliens in detention.266 Once IC releases an alien, 
regardless of the conditions of her or his release, ICE is no longer able to pay for the 
medical care. As important as the question of who pays for medical care is, the answer is 
outside the scope of this thesis. It is worth remembering that many aliens who are in 
removal proceedings but not detained by ICE are already receiving healthcare in the 
United States. 
The picture is much less complicated for aliens who are in ICE custody; ICE pays 
all healthcare costs for detained aliens. Because ICE does not publish information on the 
cost of detainee healthcare, it is impossible to estimate accurately the potential additional 
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cost of curing TB before removal, but a model can be created using existing data. As 
outlined in Chapter IV, ICE reported 416 active TB patients between January 2004 and 
July 2006.267 If the CDC estimate of $17,000 is used as a cost estimate to cure active TB, 
then it would have cost ICE $7,072,000 to cure those 416 people in addition to the cost of 
detention. This translates into $2,828,800 per year. While this is a large sum of money, it 
must be kept in perspective. As noted in Chapter IV, in FY13 ICE detained an average of 
32,805 aliens per day at an average cost of $119 for a total of $3,903,795 per day. The 
estimated cost of curing 416 aliens of active TB is less than ICE spends on two days of 
detention. 
C. SUMMARY 
One policy option to overcome difficulties in curing deported aliens of TB after 
their removal is to cure the disease in the United States prior to their removal. There are 
many barriers to such a policy; the first of these is that the DHS only identifies TB 
through the detention intake screening process. A protocol could be created to do a 
symptom screening at the time of arrest, but this would have limited usefulness as many 
people with TB are asymptomatic. The removal process often takes enough time to treat 
TB disease completely, but if this were done while an alien was in detention, it would be 
both costly and face potential legal challenges. The use of ICE’s Alternatives to 
Detention Program would ameliorate the high cost of detention and remove legal 
challenges but delivering medical treatment could still be problematic. The DHS is not 
able to pay for the medical treatment of aliens who are not in detention. 
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VI. POLICY OPTION: INCREASE INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION TO TREAT TUBERCULOSIS AFTER REMOVAL 
Some potential modifications to U.S. immigration enforcement policy would take 
place outside of the U.S. border. Studies by the CDC and other groups have suggested 
that increased international cooperation is a vital component of a national strategy to 
combat TB.268 This chapter presents a review of increased international cooperation as a 
policy option. Also, it presents several options to present a more thorough picture of the 
range of options available when considering the DHS’s response to TB. However, 
consideration is given only to cooperation that somehow intersects with U.S. immigration 
enforcement, usually in the context of a procedure that occurs after someone with TB has 
been deported. 
Tuberculosis is a global problem that does not stop at border crossings. For 
example, the geographic region surrounding the U.S. border with Mexico has an 
incidence of TB that is higher than the general rate in either country. The population 
along the border is very transient, with an estimated 300 million people legally or 
illegally crossing that border every year.269 Sometimes border crossers return to their 
country of origin, and sometimes they stay. Deportation from the United States does not 
stop the cross-border activity; as previously noted, 25 percent of the aliens arrested by 
CBP at the U.S.-Mexico border had been previously removed from the United States. 
This fluidity of population means that combatting the threat TB poses to public health in 
the United States is an issue that must be tackled on both sides of the border. When the 
concept of the border is expanded to include international air travel, the multi-national 
nature of the threat of TB is compounded even further. 
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A. POLICY DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON TO STATUS QUO 
This policy option begins with the basic understanding that the United States 
maintains a public health interest in an alien with TB until that alien is cured. The United 
States engages in enhanced cooperation with countries receiving deportees undergoing 
TB treatment to ensure that the deportee is cured of the disease. The increased 
international cooperation policy option maintains the same procedures as the status quo 
until the DHS removes the person from the United States. As explained in Chapter IV, 
the DHS already uses two referral services, TBNet, and CureTB, to coordinate continuity 
of care after deportation. For this policy analysis, it is presumed that the DHS would 
continue to use these referral services and would also increase cooperation in other ways.  
1. Current International Cooperation Measures 
The CDC uses a three-step referral program for anyone who begins treatment for 
TB in the United States but relocates to another country before completion of treatment—
regardless of their immigration status.270These steps are, 
• Notification of TB control personnel in the patient’s country of 
destination.  
• TB control personnel in that country advise patient to complete treatment.  
• Patient is advised and educated on the importance of completing 
treatment.  
As described in Chapter IV, ICE’s use of TBNet and CureTB mirrors these three steps.  
The fact that different countries use different definitions for active TB 
complicates the international referral process. This situation could result in deportees 
with TB no longer receiving treatment once they arrive in their country of citizenship. 
This, in turn, could contribute to the deportee developing drug resistance which could 
then be spread to others. For example, a case diagnosed as active TB in the United States 
might not be considered to be active TB in Mexico. Tuberculosis diagnosis in Mexico is 
made almost exclusively using an acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smear.271 As discussed in 
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Chapter II, the AFB smear is not an infallible method of diagnosing TB. A review of the 
known TB cases in ICE custody in 2006 showed that only 46 of the 175 cases were 
positive using the AFB smear.272 The implication is that almost 75percent of the cases of 
TB being treated by ICE in 2006 before removal to Mexico might not have continued to 
receive treatment after deportation if the final cultures were negative. Similar situations 
are possible in any country that does not use the same diagnostic methodology as the 
United States. To help combat this problem, the CDC recommended the creation of a 
uniform case definition.273 
For this reason, ICE typically does not treat immigration detainees for latent TB 
infection unless they have a complicating condition, such as HIV.274 However, this 
practice is also problematic. As explained in Chapter II, people with latent TB infection 
are more likely to develop active TB. Thus, the cycle continues—the deportee may either 
develop TB in a country where TB treatment outcomes are highly likely to be less 
optimal than in the United States, transmit the TB infection to family and co-workers, or 
return to the United States with active TB.  
2. Current Public Health Cooperation Efforts between the United States 
and Other Countries 
International cooperation to combat TB is an ongoing and ever-evolving effort. 
For example, the United States and China are involved in a joint research partnership to 
study TB at the Henan Provincial Chest Hospital.275 While these efforts are important, 
they fall outside the scope of this thesis. One effort that is more directly applicable to 
immigration enforcement is the Binational Border Infectious Disease Surveillance 
Program (BIDS), established in 1999, between the United States and Mexico. The CDC 
website explains, “BIDS relies on local, state, and federal collaboration to enhance 
infectious disease surveillance, build border-region epidemiology and laboratory 
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capacity, and strengthen binational communication systems to improve disease 
prevention.”276 Thus, the ICE IHSC reporting a Mexican deportee undergoing TB 
treatment to the Mexican Secretaria de Salud is a function of BIDS. In the United States, 
BIDS is funded by the CDC through grants to public health partners at the local level. 
This allows those partners to direct surveillance efforts at local priorities, concentrate on 
groups, such as border-crossers and other highly mobile populations, and coordinate with 
similar local-level groups across the border.277 BIDS led to the creation of the “U.S.-
Mexico Guidelines for Cooperation” adopted in 2012.278 
3. U.S.-Funded Directly Observed Therapy (Short-Course) Programs 
One study suggested that if the United States were to pay for DOT programs in 
countries that are sources of migration to the United States, it would be both effective at 
controlling TB and less expensive than treating the same patient in the United States.279 
The study modeled outcomes in three countries: Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic. In addition, the study looked at three possible strategies for dealing with TB: 
chest X-rays (the status quo), chest X-rays and increased tuberculin skin testing, the 
United States funding an expansion of DOT programs in the countries. The study 
concluded that even if the United States paid for all costs to increase DOT in Mexico, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, it would ultimately result in cost savings to the 
United States in both direct and indirect costs for treating TB.280 Increased screening in 
addition to the expansion of DOT was even more effective but also much more 
expensive.281  
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There are many important points referenced in the study. The authors of the study 
pointed out an important difference between enhanced screening programs and funding 
DOT programs: a screening program would only involve legal migrants.282 Increasing a 
country’s ability to treat TB through a DOT program would affect both legal and illegal 
migrants. It also emphasized that the higher the burden of TB in a country the greater the 
benefit derived from increasing DOT programs. This idea can be expanded to cover other 
countries from which large numbers of illegal migrants to the United States originate, 
many of which have TB burdens higher than either the United States or Mexico. Chapter 
II presented the TB rates of several countries of interest, and Chapter VII provides further 
discussion of the effect of increased screening programs.  
4. Technology Enabled Directly Observed Therapy (Short-Course) 
There are many challenges in delivering a DOT program to deportees. The U.S. 
border with Mexico is a medically underserved area.283 Furthermore, DOT and other TB 
control programs worldwide are chronically underfunded.284 Even if a DOT program 
were consistently available, it is not always easy for people to undergo such therapy, and 
these challenges are most pronounced in low- to middle-income countries.285 That is to 
say, the countries from which most illegal migrants come to the United States. By 
definition DOT requires daily supervision, meaning that either the patient must travel to a 
clinic to be observed taking their medication, or a medical professional must travel to the 
patient. If the patient has a work schedule that conflicts with available clinic hours, this 
can be a very difficult barrier to treatment, as can the difficulty of travel to and from a 
clinic.  
In a world where the number of people with access to smartphones or another 
portable computing technology grows ever larger, it seems only natural that healthcare 
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professionals would turn to technology to enable programs such as DOT. This type of 
mobile data enabled healthcare has come to be known as “mobile health” or just “m-
health.”286 ITU, the United Nations agency responsible for information and 
telecommunications, estimates that in 2015 69 percent of the world’s population is 
covered by 3G mobile broadband, and 89 percent of those living in urban areas have 
access to mobile broadband.287  
Mobile health is a new venture, and more research is necessary to determine the 
effectiveness of m-health intervention on TB. Existing uses for m-health in TB control 
programs include educational text messages, communicating test results, diagnostics 
(through transmission of pictures and other data), and even a cough detector.288 Small 
studies have been performed to review the usefulness of sending messages reminding TB 
patients of their clinical appointments, but these have shown little improvement over 
standard clinical visits. A more innovative idea is a pill box linked to a smartphone 
application that monitors when the box is opened and sends a reminder if the patient does 
not open the box within a specified timeframe. This approach has shown good 
preliminary results, but more testing is needed.289 
Another m-health technology being explored is the use of video monitoring for 
DOT.290 The concept is simple: patients would use their computer or smartphone to log 
into an application that films them taking their medicine. This should theoretically have 
the same benefits as a clinical DOT program in that a medical professional could review 
the video and confirm that medication was taken. Such a program could be beneficial for 
reasons, including lowering the burden on both deportee patients and healthcare 
providers.  
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There are many limitations to m-health monitoring of TB treatment, the most 
obvious of which is that the deportee would need access to wireless coverage. As 
previously cited, this is becoming less of an issue worldwide, but there are still millions 
of people in the world without access to mobile phones. It must also be noted that the 
antibiotics used to treat TB are not without side effects, and side effects are some of the 
primary reasons that patients discontinue treatment.291 Dealing with treatment side effects 
might be even more challenging for patients who are not directly seeing a healthcare 
professional.  
5. Contact Investigations 
Anyone with active TB might spread the disease to anyone else who shares his or 
her air space. Therefore, when a public health agency becomes aware of someone with 
active TB, it performs what is known as a “contact investigation.”292 During this 
investigation, officials attempt to locate every person with whom the infected person has 
had significant contact during the contagious period and determine if those people have 
contracted TB. This is particularly urgent in the case of multidrug-resistant and 
extensively drug-resistant TB due to the difficulty of curing these forms of the disease. In 
today’s highly interconnected world, such investigations can be extremely difficult and 
complex. 
For example, in 2012 CBP encountered its first known case of extensively drug-
resistant TB. The U.S. Border Patrol apprehended the person while he was attempting to 
cross the U.S. border near McAllen, Texas.293 The man was not from Mexico; he was 
from Nepal. In the course of his journey to the United States, he passed through Asia, 
Brazil, and Mexico. He traveled by airplane, boat, car, and on foot. It is nearly impossible 
to know how many people with whom he came into contact on this journey, but he could 
have infected any of them. Twelve Border Patrol agents who dealt with the unnamed man 
were tested for TB; fortunately, none of them tested positive.  
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Contact investigations are an important part of a tuberculosis control program. 
While dealing with these investigations in the immigration enforcement context requires 
extensive international cooperation, they can have benefits for the United States as well 
as the other country involved. For example, a 2013 study noted, “Improving contact 
investigations in Mexico will likely translate in a decrease in TB incidence not only in 
Mexico but also in U.S. border states.”294 BIDS was one important step in this direction, 
but as the case of the Nepalese man with XDR-TB illustrates an agreement with a single 
country is not sufficient.  
B. ANALYSIS OF THE INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
POLICY OPTION 
The CDC identified increased international cooperation as a necessary component 
of a worldwide strategy to stop the spread of TB. Challenges to the delivery of TB 
treatment include social stigma, access to medical care, competing resource demands 
(e.g., food versus healthcare), and a distrust of government.295 These challenges apply to 
deportees as much as they apply to the general populace and arguably more so due to the 
low economic standing of most illegal migrants to the United States. Addressing the 
majority of these societal issues is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, studies show 
there are things that can be done to increase access to and compliance with DOT 
programs. Mobile health is one of those things. Such technologies could apply to 
deportees with access to mobile technology. Additional studies are necessary to 
determine both the effectiveness and cost of such programs. 
All efforts to expand international cooperation in treating TB will incur a cost. It 
would require additional research on the specific expansion program pursued to 
determine the amount of that cost. 
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There are several possible ways to increase international cooperation to treat TB 
after deportation. These include the development of a uniform case definition for TB, 
treatment for TB infection outside of the United States, increased cooperation to perform 
contact investigations, the use of novel technologies such as mobile health, and the U.S. 
funding DOT programs in other countries. All of these topics are areas for which 
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VII. POLICY OPTION: INCREASE TUBERCULOSIS TESTING 
Before someone can be treated for TB, it is first necessary to know if she or he 
has the disease. The DHS has no data on how many migrants with LTBI or TB that 
immigration officers encounter. This is because, as explained in Chapter IV, only aliens 
detained for more than 72 hours are tested for TB. The DHS releases most aliens it 
encounters in less than 72 hours, and thus they are never tested for TB (see Chapters III 
and IV). At the same time, aliens not in detention are frequently in removal proceedings 
for a year or more. This means that if they have undiagnosed TB, then they have the 
opportunity to pass the disease on to others, or to develop TB disease if they entered the 
country with LTBI. 
What is known is that the prevalence of TB in ICE custody is much higher than 
the general population of the United States or even the general populations of the 
countries from which most aliens encountered by the DHS come. A recently completed 
study reviewed the medical records of aliens detained by ICE during 2014 at facilities 
where IHSC provided direct medical care, a population consisting of 144,379 individuals. 
There were 147 confirmed cases of TB disease among this group.296 This equates to a TB 
incidence of 102 cases per 100,000 people, nearly 33 times the general incidence of TB 
in the United States (see Chapter II)! Of the countries discussed in this thesis (the United 
States, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, China, India, and Russia), only India 
has a higher incidence of TB than that found in ICE detention. The study also identified 
multiple factors that made the ICE detainees more susceptible to TB than the general 
population. These include malnutrition, crowded living conditions, and other stressors 
from migrating that exacerbate the chance of reactivating LTBI. Also identified are 
known risk factors for TB transmission such as homelessness, substance abuse, and 
previous detention. An additional consideration is the possibility of exposure to TB in 
areas where TB is more prevalent such as detention centers and the U.S.-Mexico border 
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region.297 Again, these 147 cases are from a subset of ICE detainees, and detainees are a 
subset of the people encountered by the DHS. There is currently no way to know how 
many people with active TB are encountered each year by the DHS. 
The final policy option analyzed in this thesis is to increase the amount of TB 
testing done by the DHS on arrested aliens. This chapter begins with a review of the 
current DHS policy on TB testing arrested aliens. It then reviews the practicalities of 
expanding testing programs using different testing methods. Finally, it presents an 
analysis of the effect of expanded testing efforts, considering multiple permutations of 
testing methods and subjects. 
A. THE STATUS QUO OF TB TESTING 
As explained in Chapter II, both symptom screening and diagnostic testing are 
necessary parts of diagnosing TB. Chapter V discussed the option of additional symptom 
screening at the time of arrest. Symptom screening involves an interview with the alien, a 
physical examination for symptoms of TB, and a review of the alien’s medical history. 
Diagnostic testing involves the use of radiology (chest X-rays), the tuberculin skin test 
(TST), interferon gamma release assay (IGRA) blood test, sputum smear/acid fast bacilli 
(AFB) test, or sputum culture.  
The status quo is that the DHS only tests for TB those aliens detained for more 
than 72 hours. The 2011 PBNDS establishes ICE’s current policy on TB testing.298 The 
standards provide many “expected outcomes” that must be met by all detention facilities. 
Some of the outcomes (numbered as in the PBNDS) applicable to TB are: 
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines for the 
prevention and control of infectious and communicable diseases shall be 
followed. 
2. Detainees with chronic conditions shall receive care and treatment, as 
needed, including monitoring of medications, diagnostic testing, and 
chronic care clinics. 
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3. Each detainee shall receive a comprehensive medical, dental, and mental 
health intake screening within 12 hours upon arrival at each detention 
facility. 
4. Each detainee shall receive a comprehensive health assessment, including 
a physical examination and mental health screening, by a qualified, 
licensed healthcare professional no later than 14 days after entering into 
ICE custody or arrival at the facility.299 
The 2011 PBNDS also provides:  
All new arrivals shall receive TB screening within 12 hours of intake and 
in accordance with CDC guidelines (www.cdc.gov/tb). For detainees that 
have been in continuous law enforcement custody, symptom screening 
plus documented TB screening within six months of arrival may be 
accepted for intake screening purposes. 
Annual or periodic TB testing shall be implemented in accordance with 
CDC guidelines.300 
To understand the ICE policy on TB testing, then, it is necessary to know the 
CDC guidelines on testing. The CDC website, www.cdc.gov/TB, provides the most 
current information on CDC guidelines for TB. Chapter II presents additional information 
on TB testing. Testing using the TST, IGRA, AFB smear, sputum culture, and chest X-
ray are all recognized under the CDC guidelines.  
Testing for TB infection is different than testing for TB disease. The TST or 
IGRA blood test identify TB infection. The AFB smear, sputum culture, or chest X-ray 
test for the TB disease. The distinction is an important one because both types of testing 
are permitted under the CDC guidelines and thus under the PBNDS. The exact TB test 
used by a detention facility has many implications. For example, an alien with a positive 
TST requires additional testing to rule out TB disease. This means that additional medical 
resources, including the time of the medical staff at the facility, must be expended on the 
detainee. It also means additional healthcare costs for the detention facility and thus for 
the DHS. 
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IHSC is primarily concerned with detecting and treating active TB disease as a 
way of controlling infection in a congregated setting, and the chest X-ray is the primary 
tool used by the IHSC to diagnose active TB disease.301 Detainees are usually not treated 
for LTBI at IHSC facilities due to the likelihood that treatment will not continue if the 
alien is deported. Though there are some exceptions, such as co-morbidity with other 
diseases such as HIV, this is only true at the facilities where IHSC directly provides 
medical services. Other facilities may choose to treat LTBI or not. If aliens begins 
treatment at such a facility and then that treatment is discontinued once they return to 
their native country, they are at risk for developing drug resistance that can then be 
transmitted to others if they develop active TB disease. 
B. ANALYSIS OF TB TESTING METHODS IN AN IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT SETTING 
All diagnostic tools have both benefits and drawbacks. This section provides an 
analysis of the pros and cons of different testing methods in the context of immigration 
enforcement. 
1. Tuberculin Skin Test 
As discussed in Chapter II a tuberculin skin test requires 48 to 72 hours before a 
medical professional can evaluate the results. This makes the TST impractical for anyone 
detained less than 72 hours. Any alien released from custody after receiving a TST could 
be required to report to a healthcare worker to have the test evaluated at a later date, but 
this presents many logistic challenges. As noted in Chapter V, the DHS has no 
mechanism to pay for medical care after ICE releases someone from detention. The DHS 
would be forced to rely on local public health services or other medical providers to 
evaluate TST tests and take appropriate action. However, those providers have no legal 
obligation to report TB testing results or treatment to the DHS and may even be 
prevented by health privacy laws from disclosing such information. This could make 
tracking of the alien’s treatment impossible, something that then poses a safety concern 
for future actions between the DHS and the infected person. The DHS does not restrict 
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the locations to which an alien may travel after release. For example, an alien could be 
released by the U.S. Border Patrol in Laredo and relocate to New York City. This would 
make coordination with public health entities extremely challenging. Aliens may also 
provide one address but then choose to reside in another location or reside in an area with 
limited availability of medical services. There is also a question of what the DHS’s 
recourse would be if the tested person did not comply with instructions to have the test 
evaluated in a timely manner. This is particularly true in the case of family units and 
others who have legal concerns regarding their detention. 
The TST is used to diagnose latent TB infection. Additional testing is required to 
determine if someone with a positive TST has infectious TB. 
2. Interferon Gamma Release Assay Blood Test 
The IGRA is another tool used to detect latent TB infection. In the immigration 
enforcement context, it has many of the same disadvantages as the TST, such as the time 
necessary to obtain results and the difficulty of the DHS taking action when there is a 
positive diagnosis of TB. The IGRA has the additional disadvantage of requiring a 
healthcare worker to obtain a blood sample and ship that sample to a laboratory for 
evaluation. 
Another disadvantage of the IGRA comes from the sheer volume of people 
encountered by the DHS. In FY2015 the U.S. Border Patrol arrested 337,117 persons or 
an average of 924 people per day.302 Such a high volume of people makes the handling 
and processing of samples extremely challenging. It is also possible that laboratories 
would not be able to evaluate such a large collection of samples. However, the evaluation 
of current TB laboratory facilities in the United States is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The IGRA does have some advantages over the TST. One such advantage of the 
IGRA is that the tested person is not required to report to a healthcare worker to have the 
test evaluated. This also eliminates uncertainty over who would pay for the testing, 
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although for aliens released from detention the treatment of that person’s TB would still 
fall on the public health system. Another advantage is that the CDC recommends the use 
of the IGRA for people who have received the BCG vaccine.303 As discussed in Chapter 
II, most migrants come from countries where the BCG is in common use.  
3. Chest X-Ray 
Advanced communication tools, such as the internet, created a relatively new type 
of medicine known as telemedicine. At its most basic, telemedicine is the ability to have 
a person in one location receive medical services from a healthcare provider at another 
location and contact between the two carried out through the transmission of high-
definition images and other data. When telemedicine is used to read X-rays, it is known 
as teleradiology.304 Teleradiology has made the use of a chest X-ray to diagnose active 
TB disease possible even at remote locations, such as some Border Patrol stations. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to using teleradiology to diagnose TB. 
The primary advantage of teleradiology is that it is possible to obtain a result within a 
matter of hours, making the test practical even for people detained for only a short period. 
The test is relatively inexpensive; under the current ICE contract, the direct cost is $12.60 
per X-ray at ICE detention facilities.305 However, a radiology testing program would also 
require equipment, a location to administer the X-ray, and trained personnel not normally 
present at DHS arrest and processing locations. Moreover, in some states, special training 
and licensing are required to administer such X-rays.306 There are health risks associated 
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with any use of radiology, but the health risks of chest X-rays by themselves are very 
low.307 
Teleradiology is used to detect active TB disease. 
4. Acid Fast Bacilli Test 
As discussed in Chapter II, the acid fast bacilli (AFB) test is the diagnostic tool 
most commonly used worldwide to detect TB. The AFB requires collecting a sputum 
sample from the person tested. Sputum is not the same as spittle; rather, it is the fluid 
produced from within the lungs during coughing.308 This limits testing to only those 
persons that currently have a productive cough. According to the American Thoracic 
Society, “it is of utmost importance that careful attention be given to the collection and 
handling of specimens.”309 While such careful sampling is possible at detention center 
medical clinics, it is not practical at arrest and processing sites such as Border Patrol 
stations. In addition, transporting samples to a laboratory takes time, as does the analysis 
of the samples. This means that, as with a TST, the tested alien could be released from 
custody before receiving the results of the AFB.  
As with all medical procedures, the cost must also be taken into account. There is 
no federal estimate for the cost of an AFB, but as one point of reference, the Missouri 
Department of Health and Senior Services charges healthcare providers $48 per test.310 
The DHS does not keep data on apprehended aliens with productive coughs, and so it is 
not possible to further estimate the cost of an AFB testing program.  
The low specificity of the AFB (see Chapter II) is also a disadvantage. Once a 
positive smear result had been received, additional testing is be required, usually in the 
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form of a sputum culture. The additional time required to receive a culture result means 
that even aliens originally detained by the DHS might no longer be in custody by the time 
the results were received.  
One potential advantage of this two-part testing process is that because the test 
would begin while an alien is in ICE custody, the DHS might be able to absorb the cost 
of the test rather than transmitting the cost to a local health department. A more in-depth 
review of DHS medical funding would be necessary to determine the exact conditions 
under which the DHS could provide this funding. 
The AFB is used to detect TB disease. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL TB TESTING 
An analysis of additional TB testing in an immigration enforcement context 
requires the consideration of multiple scenarios. The policy would need to address 
whether testing should be for latent TB infection or TB disease. Additionally, the most 
effective testing methodology would need to be selected. The policy would need to cover 
whether there should be additional testing in detention, at the time of arrest and 
processing, or both. Finally, the policy would need to distinguish between the general 
testing of all arrested or detained persons and the targeted testing of specific populations. 
These scenarios are interdependent. For example, the choice of testing method depends 
on who is tested and where. The choice to test for LTBI or TB disease changes the 
method used and whether it is used only in detention or also at the time of apprehension, 
etc. 
1. Testing for Latent TB Infection versus Testing for TB Disease 
As previously discussed, ICE does not normally treat arrested aliens for LTBI due 
to the likelihood that they would not continue to receive treatment if removed from the 
United States. Unless the DHS were to adopt the policy that all aliens should be treated 
for LTBI, it does not make sense to test for latent TB infection.  
As outlined in Chapter III, in many cases aliens both in removal proceedings, 
whether in custody or out of custody, are in the United States for a sufficient length of 
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time to complete TB treatment. This makes the treatment of LTBI a practical possibility. 
The Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) recommends that 
people in high-risk populations should be treated for LTBI to prevent them from 
developing contagious TB.311 High-risk populations include “foreign-born persons, 
including children, recently arrived (within five years) from countries that have a high TB 
incidence or prevalence.”312 The ACET does not define high incidence or prevalence 
beyond noting that it included “most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.”313 
This broad group of countries encompasses the countries from which the majority of 
illegal migrants to the United States come.  
It is also true that certain groups, for example, Mexican citizens with final orders 
of removal, do not remain in ICE custody for a period long enough to treat LTBI. If the 
DHS were to adopt the practice of treating aliens for LTBI, it would be necessary to 
make a determination on a case by case basis whether to initiate such treatment. 
2. Choice of Testing Methodology 
There has been no definitive study recommending one type of testing program as 
the best. The CDC guidelines provide for the use of multiple methods to detect TB. A 
2001 study of tuberculosis screening in federal prison concluded that the TST and chest 
X-ray were near equals in specificity, but that the rapid results from chest X-rays meant 
that both staff and detainees were exposed to infectious inmates for a shorter length of 
time.314 In addition, a 2016 study concluded that 20 percent of TB cases in ICE detention 
would not have been detected without the use of a chest X-ray.315 The current low cost of 
the chest X-ray and availability of teleradiology for facilities that do not have a dedicated 
medical provider capable of interpreting a chest X-ray are also factors in its favor.  
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The choice of methodology also depends on the decision of whether to test for 
LTBI or only for TB disease. If ICE continues primarily to treat active TB cases, then the 
choice of diagnostic method is reduced to the AFB smear or the chest X-ray, and the 
chest X-ray has a greater specificity than the AFB smear. According to ACET,  
Chest radiography is the preferred screening method when the objective is 
to identify persons who have current pulmonary TB and when preventive 
therapy for infected persons is not the primary goal (e.g., in high turnover 
jails or in some homeless shelters).316  
The ACET does not define a “high turnover jail,” but the phrase accurately describes 
immigration detention. 
3. Testing at Apprehension versus Additional Testing in Detention 
ICE detention standards require that all aliens detained for over 72 hours receive a 
TB test. Thus, the issue under consideration for a potential policy change is whether this 
is sufficient or if testing should be expanded to include aliens released immediately or 
detained for less than 72 hours.  
As discussed in this chapter as well as previous chapters, aliens encountered by 
the DHS have many factors putting them at an increased risk for TB. There is no special 
sub-set of factors that makes aliens screened for TB as they enter detention facilities more 
likely to have TB than aliens who are released directly from Border Patrol stations or ICE 
field offices. Therefore, it is likely that rate of TB prevalence is the same for all arrested 
aliens.  
According to the ACET, when creating a strategy to combat TB, “the first priority 
is identifying and completely treating all persons who have active TB.”317 Because the 
DHS tests only a fraction of the aliens encountered for TB, only a fraction of the cases of 
active TB is currently identified and treated. 
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4. Targeted Testing versus General Testing 
Any testing program must decide who to test in addition to which test to perform. 
The status quo, as discussed above, is to test all aliens in detention for more than 72 
hours. The issue for a potential policy change is whether, if the DHS tested aliens at 
arrest and processing sites, it would test all arrested aliens or only a select population. 
The CDC does not recommend testing for people with a low risk of LTBI. However, the 
CDC recommends testing for “recent immigrants from high prevalence countries.”318 
Again, the term “high prevalence countries” is not defined. 
It is possible to look at targeted versus general testing through a cost/benefit filter. 
There have been no studies comparing the cost of targeted or general testing programs in 
the United States. However, a 2014 study in Australia examined the issue of whether 
Australia should test all immigrants for TB or only those immigrants coming from 
countries with a high prevalence of TB. Australia is similarly positioned to the United 
States in that it has an incidence of TB lower than the countries from which it receives 
migrants.319 The study concluded that testing everyone would reduce the spread of TB in 
Australia, but that it was much more expensive than targeted testing.320 
D. SUMMARY 
As previously discussed, the DHS currently performs TB tests only on aliens in 
detention for over 72 hours. Because the majority of aliens are not detained, they are also 
not tested for TB. There are several testing methods recognized by the CDC, including 
the tuberculin skin test, interferon-gamma release assay, chest radiography, and acid-fast 
bacilli smear. All of these tests have disadvantages in the context of immigration 
enforcement. Of these four methods, the chest X-ray has been shown to be the most 
effective at identifying active TB in the population encountered by the DHS. Changes in 
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technology have made it possible to implement an X-ray program at arrest and processing 
centers, but research would need to be done to determine its practicality. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PROS AND CONS OF THE POLICY OPTIONS 
This section reviews each policy option presented in the thesis and presents an 
analysis of the positive and negative aspects of each option.  
1. Pros and Cons of the Status Quo Policy 
The status quo policy option does have several factors that recommend its 
continued use. First, it follows the current CDC guidelines on treating TB for aliens in 
detention. The policy also emphasizes the continuity of care through referrals to public 
health agencies, both domestically and abroad. This should theoretically work to reduce 
the chance of aliens who have been deported or released from custody developing drug-
resistant or multi-drug resistant TB. Finally, the status quo has a great advantage in that it 
requires no additional work or resources. The DHS wrote the procedures, Congress 
provided the funding, and implementation has already occurred. 
However, the status quo policy option also has sizeable factors that argue against 
it. The first is that the status quo does not identify all cases of active TB, nor does it 
completely treat cases of active TB. Thus, it does not meet the criteria for the optimal 
policy. Under the status quo policy, the true boundaries of the interaction between 
immigration enforcement and TB are impossible to know. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the countries from which the United States receives the majority of unlawful 
migrants all have higher incidences of TB than does the United States. The incidence of 
TB in ICE detention is also much higher than the rate of TB in the United States. ICE 
releases the majority of aliens it encounters or returns Mexican citizens directly to 
Mexico without detention or formal proceedings. Because ICE only performs TB tests 
and medical evaluations on aliens who are in detention for more than 72 hours, it is 
impossible to say with any certainty how many people with latent or active TB are 
encountered by the DHS. 
Another factor for consideration is the differing healthcare requirements of the 
multiple ICE detention standards. Facilities where the IHSC provides healthcare have 
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excellent TB control programs, but this is not necessarily the case at other detention 
centers. Those other facilities may use different testing methods, may or may not treat 
detainees for LTBI, and may or may not notify the IHSC of cases of TB. This also means 
that international referrals may or may not be made when the alien with TB is deported, 
thus increasing the chance of incomplete treatment.  
Any person who breathes the same air as another person with infectious TB is at 
risk of contracting the disease. A person with infectious TB is a constant risk to others, 
whether at home, during travel to the United States, in a transporting vehicle, at a 
processing facility, in a detention facility, or in the community at large. TB respects 
neither occupation nor nationality; immigration officers, other migrants, and the public in 
both the United States and the alien’s country of origin are all at risk. As referenced in 
Chapter II, people with latent TB, although not infectious, are at an enhanced risk of 
developing active TB. Such people then continue to pose a threat to public health for 
years after United States immigration authorities encounter them. 
2. Pros and Cons of Curing TB before Removal 
The United States has an extremely low incidence of TB compared to the other 
countries of special interest considered in this thesis: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, China, India, and Russia. This indicates that the United States has better 
outcomes with TB treatment than do these countries. While it is true that this list 
comprises only a fraction of all of the nations on Earth, it does cover the four countries to 
which ICE removes the greatest number of people each year. Therefore, curing aliens of 
TB in the United States before removal should provide better outcomes for the majority 
of removed aliens.  
This policy option is superior to the status quo policy in that it meets one of the 
two priorities identified by ACET: complete treatment of all cases of active TB disease. 
Without additional policy change, it would do nothing to address the priority of 
identifying all cases of active TB. Adding health screenings during processing could 
identify some aliens with TB prior to a detention screening but might have limited impact 
due to the lack of symptoms in many people with TB. At the same time, if it were 
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necessary to hire people specifically to do these screenings, then it would increase the 
already high cost of immigration enforcement, thus turning the positive factor into a 
potentially negative one. 
The potentially negative public perception of the detention or other case 
management aspects of this policy option poses a potential negative factor. It could be 
argued that detaining aliens so that they may complete a course of treatment is the first 
step down a very slippery slope. In Zadvydas and other decisions, the Supreme Court has 
held that there must be procedural protections for lengthy detention and that it must apply 
to a narrow group of people. Diseases of public health significance are already a specific 
set of illnesses established by statute, and this arguably provides both the necessary 
procedural protection and constitutes the necessary narrow group. 
Many of the negative aspects of detention can be solved through the use of ICE’s 
Alternatives to Detention Program. The program is far less expensive than traditional 
detention, and allows ICE a way to monitor compliance with TB treatment. 
Cost also remains a substantial negative factor. As outlined in Chapter V, 
referring additional aliens for treatment would result in additional healthcare costs. To 
exacerbate this factor, current funding allocations would not allow the DHS to bear the 
burden of these additional costs for any alien not in detention. This could be particularly 
problematic for aliens who reside in areas that are already facing public health funding 
shortages. It is not possible to estimate the additional cost of curing TB prior to removal, 
but it remains an unalterable fact that treating additional people means spending more 
money. 
3. Pros and Cons of Increased International Cooperation to Treat TB 
after Removal 
It is difficult to assess the pros and cons of this policy option because it is not a 
single option. There are a myriad of ways that cooperation could be increased, each of 
which would then need to be evaluated for its costs and its benefits. There is little 
research available on the options presented as examples of possible increased 
cooperation. 
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Of the international factors that affect the treatment of tuberculosis arguably the 
factor with the greatest impact is that different countries do not use the same testing 
methodology or definition for TB. It is currently possible that deported TB patients would 
not continue to receive TB treatment after their removal because their receiving country 
would not consider them to have TB. An analysis of the barriers to the creation of a 
universal definition for TB is outside the scope of this thesis.  
The use of the DOT protocol to treat TB has successfully contributed to TB 
control efforts in countries such as the United States and China. Helping to ensure that 
deported aliens complete TB treatment using DOT should not only help fight TB in the 
receiving country, but also in the United States due to the one quarter of deported aliens 
who return to the United States after removal. Although there has been limited research 
in this area, the concept of providing DOT through the use of mobile technology, such as 
smart phones, has shown early promise. Ever increasing numbers of people, particularly 
in metropolitan areas, have access to mobile broadband technology. 
The existence of substantial social and economic barriers to deported aliens 
receiving medical treatment is a complicating factor with this policy option. As discussed 
in Chapter I, unlawful migrants are typically from lower social and income strata. In 
countries that do not pay for medical care, the cost of treatment may prevent deported 
aliens from receiving treatment, particularly if they are asymptomatic and do not feel like 
they need medical treatment. This economic barrier could also make it difficult or 
impossible for a deported person to participate in mobile-health enabled DOT. 
4. Pros and Cons of Additional Testing 
It is a fact that the DHS does not know how many people with TB it encounters. 
Any increase in testing should pay dividends in the detection of additional cases of TB. 
Depending on one’s point of view, this can be a pro or a con. As long as the DHS is 
unaware of the existence of a case of TB, there is no moral, legal, or ethical requirement 
to treat it. Once the DHS becomes aware of a person has TB, it is then bound at the very 
least to determine if that person is contagious.  
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Another perspective relating to testing suggests that once the DHS is aware that 
someone has TB, then that person can be treated. This protects both the individual and 
the public. It also makes it possible to perform a contact investigation to find people who 
have come into contact with the infected person and are thus at risk for transmission of 
the disease. This includes the immigration officers responsible for the person’s arrest, 
transportation, and detention. 
An unavoidable negative aspect of this policy option is that any program of 
additional testing will incur additional costs. Depending on the test used the costs could 
include testing materials, personnel, physical space, equipment, specimen handling and 
transporting, and laboratory fees in addition to the cost of treating any diagnosed TB. 
More research is necessary to determine the cost of any chosen program of additional 
testing. 
All of the CDC approved methods of testing for TB have drawbacks in the 
context of immigration enforcement. Some research has shown that the chest X-ray is the 
most effective method of testing for TB disease, but there are many logistical hurdles to 
implementing a universal radiology program at all arrest and processing sites. For 
instance, the DHS would need to purchase equipment, provide facility space, train 
personnel, and fund the program. 
Finally, regardless of the effectiveness of a testing program, there would be 
substantial barriers to providing medical treatment for any aliens found to have TB 
disease. As previously discussed, the DHS could not provide funding or treatment for 
aliens who are not detained. This would add additional burdens to the public health 
system even in areas where aliens had sufficient access to such a system. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 
It is apparent that tuberculosis is a serious problem in the world of immigration 
enforcement. As discussed above, the status quo policy is very effective at dealing with 
active TB in detention, but this is primarily at facilities where IHSC provides medical 
services. In Chapter I, the optimal policy solution was defined as the policy that would 
meet the ACET priority of identifying and completely treating all persons who have 
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active TB. Both additional testing and additional treatment are necessary to achieve this 
goal. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter VII, testing all arrested aliens for TB, 
while very effective, is also much more expensive. Thankfully, it is possible to achieve 
some of the outcomes of the optimal policy while making targeted changes to the status 
quo. 
Once the decision is made to focus on aliens in detention with active TB it 
simplifies the choice of diagnostic methodology. The chest X-ray is fast, highly specific, 
and inexpensive. Through the miracle of teleradiology, X-ray testing could be 
implemented at detention centers not previously capable of providing radiographic 
services. As the chest X-ray has demonstrated advantages over the TST, the ICE PBNDS 
should be modified to require the universal use of the chest X-ray for TB screening. The 
updated detention standard must then apply to all detention facilities used by ICE to 
provide uniform results in detecting active TB. 
The policy option of curing tuberculosis before removal should be implemented 
as exactly that—once the DHS is aware that an alien has active TB then that alien should 
be treated until they are cured before removal from the United States. This would apply 
to aliens both in detention and aliens released from detention. To help ensure that aliens 
who are released from detention comply with treatment requirements ICE should enroll 
aliens undergoing TB treatment in the Alternatives to Detention Program with treatment 
for tuberculosis as a requirement for continued freedom. 
Finally, as discussed in the literature review, there is only one published study 
looking at the likelihood of immigration enforcement employees contracting tuberculosis. 
That study pointed out that immigration officers were provided little to no information on 
tuberculosis.321 We must not forget that the employees of the DHS are on the front lines 
for encountering TB, and it is incumbent on the DHS to provide for their wellbeing.  
The first step towards this goal is to educate immigration officers about TB. Both 
CBP and ICE use an internet based training delivery platform known as the Performance 
                                                 
321 De Perio, Niemeier, and Neimeier, “TB Exposures among Immigration Employees;” De Perio, R. 
Niemeier, and Groenewold, “The Effectiveness of Using Interferon-gamma.”  
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and Learning Management System (PALMS).322 The DHS should develop a PALMS 
training module to inform its employees about the risks of TB. Moreover, implementing a 
PALMS training program would be an inexpensive way to provide universal coverage of 
the DHS immigration officers arresting, transporting, and detaining aliens. Both ICE and 
CBP employ course developer/instructors (CDIs); these CDIs could create a TB training 
program in conjunction with IHSC. The only additional direct cost of the program would 
be the salary paid to an employee spending the required time to complete the training.  
Training could also improve employee safety in other ways. Employees should be 
made aware that the CDC recommends TB testing for people in certain professions, 
including people who work in the detention environment.323 In addition, education about 
TB could help immigration officers recognize TB signs and symptoms. Processing forms 
can be modified to include health information, including asking about symptoms that 
might indicate the presence of TB. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
There are many potential barriers to the implementation of the proposed policy 
changes. The most obvious of these is the potential cost of the changes. Curing aliens of 
TB will result in additional medical expenses as well as additional case management 
expenses for services such as ATD. Because the DHS is only able to pay for the 
healthcare of aliens in detention, the additional cost to treat aliens released from detention 
would be born by the various state and local health departments where the aliens reside. 
The cost of implementing chest X-ray screening at all detention centers is a factor, but it 
must be remembered that all over 72-hour facilities already a TB screening program of 
some sort. At $12.60 per X-ray, it is even possible that the chest X-ray will save money. 
There is also the issue of whether state and local health departments can absorb not only 
the cost but the additional workload created by additional referrals from the DHS. This is 
an area that requires further research. 
                                                 
322 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS-ALL-049 Performance and Learning Management 
System (PALMS),” last modified August 10, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-all-049-
performance-and-learning-management-system-palms.  
323 Fenton and Castro, “Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis.”  
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As long as different detention facilities use different detention standards, there 
will be different results in TB control programs. However, this is not an insurmountable 
barrier to the proposed policy changes because, as discussed in Chapter IV, ICE is 
already working to change all detention facilities to the 2011 PBNDS. 
The largest potential barrier to the implementation of policy change is that TB and 
other infectious diseases are not a priority of the DHS and its agencies’ immigration 
enforcement policies. According to ICE, “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) enforces federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and immigration to 
promote homeland security and public safety.”324 The specific mission of Enforcement 
and Removal Operations, the component of ICE responsible for the transportation, 
detention, and removal of arrested aliens, is  
To identify, arrest, and remove aliens who present a danger to national 
security or are a risk to public safety, as well as those who enter the United 
States illegally or otherwise undermine the integrity of our immigration 
laws and our border control efforts.325  
Neither the ICE nor the ERO mission statements directly address public health or 
infectious disease. This does not mean that ICE does not care about infectious disease, 
but dealing with disease is not the agency’s primary mission. That the DHS arrests and 
detains aliens with TB and other infectious diseases is an unintended consequence of the 
DHS mission, but one that impacts public safety and thus remains part of the ICE 
mandate. 
No legislative change would be necessary to implement the recommended policy 
changes. However, if a review of public health funding found that the only practical way 
to enact the proposed changes would be for the federal government to fund all costs, then 
they would require appropriation legislation. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Tuberculosis is indisputably on the ICE agenda; changes in the PBNDS as 
recently as 2011 and the use of CureTB and TBNet to help ensure continuity of care for 
deported aliens are proof of this. ICE’s TB control program for aliens in detention meets 
CDC guidelines. It would be easy for ICE to decide that it has exercised due diligence 
and nothing further remains to be done. However, there is clearly not the case. The rates 
of TB in ICE detention are frighteningly high and particularly so when combined with the 
fact that the DHS truly has no idea how many people with TB it encounters every day. 
Discrepancies in ICE detention standards mean that the IHSC may or may not be aware 
of aliens in detention with TB. Such aliens may or may not receive complete treatment 
for their TB when they are returned to their country of origin, and this could contribute to 
the development of drug resistance and the spread of TB. Finally, many of those aliens 
will return to the United States. Targeted changes to immigration enforcement policies 
would pay dividends in increased safety for its officers and the public. Testing all 
detained aliens for TB using a chest X-ray and treating all aliens with active TB until 
cured will help alleviate these problems. 
The Department of Homeland Security recently issued a new mission statement, 
“With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and 
our values.”326 This statement again does not address TB or other infectious diseases, but 
such diseases are a hazard to both DHS employees and the public. The DHS should 
safeguard its employees, the American people, and the people of the world from the 
threat of TB. DHS immigration enforcement policies impact that threat. Should the 
United States alter its immigration enforcement policies to address more directly the 
threat that tuberculosis poses to public health? Yes.   
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